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ABSTRACT 
This study experimentally investigates how disclosing both the auditor’s obligation to 
remain independent of its client and auditor tenure in the audit report influence non-professional 
investors’ judgments and decision-making, especially the decision about whether to invest in a 
particular auditee. In the Auditor’s Reporting Model (ARM) proposal, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) asserts that inclusion of additional information in the 
audit report will improve the informativeness of the audit report for investors and as a result will 
modify its relevance to investment decisions. Using an experiment, I find that these disclosures 
positively influence non-professional investor judgments of auditor attributes – specifically 
auditor independence and auditor competence. Further, I note that the disclosures augment 
judgments of auditor credibility and audit quality as well as the report’s perceived 
informativeness. I also find that the disclosure of long tenure has a significant positive effect on 
consequent investment decisions. The findings of this study are important to informing 
regulators on how reform to the audit report increases report readers’ sensitivity to the 
perceptions of the financial statement auditor, which ultimately influences non-professional 
investor decision-making. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
I experimentally investigate how disclosures in the audit report explaining auditor 
independence and divulging the length of auditor tenure affect the judgment and decision-
making of non-professional investors. Specifically, I consider whether modifying the audit report 
to include those disclosures influences non-professional investor judgments of auditor 
characteristics, such as independence and competence, as well as their judgments about auditor 
credibility and audit quality. However, the chief purpose of this study is to examine whether and 
to what extent the disclosures influence related investment decision-making. Examining this 
question is important because the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB; the 
Board) has proposed revising the standard audit report model to include these new elements in 
the language communicated by financial statement auditors to report readers. The PCAOB 
asserts that the new disclosures in the audit report will provide financial statement users with 
specific information related to the nature and responsibility of the financial statement auditor, 
which will enhance the communicative value of the audit report and in turn potentially affect 
capital allocation (PCAOB 2011). 
The Board notes that the proposed new elements in the audit report will reflect 
characteristics of the auditor and his/her work (PCAOB 2013). Psychology literature suggests 
that revealing certain information about an information source influences an information user’s 
perception of the source’s trustworthiness and expertise and as a result the usefulness of the 
communication from the information source (e.g., Hovland and Weiss 1951; Hovland, Janis, and 
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Kelley 1953). Similarly, the extant accounting literature suggests that perceptions of two specific 
auditor attributes, independence and competence, likely influence judgments regarding the 
credibility of an auditor, the perceived quality of an audit, and the usefulness of auditor conveyed 
information (e.g., Joyce and Biddle 1981; Abdel-Khalik, Snowball, and Wragge 1983; Bamber 
1983; Brown 1983; Plumlee 1985; Schneider 1985; Rebele, Heintz, and Braden 1988; Anderson, 
Koonce, and Marchant 1994; Hirst 1994; Caster and Pincus 1996; Murphy and Yetmar 1996; 
Goodwin 1999; Reimers and Fennema 1999; Christensen, Glover, and Wolfe 2014). The 
information the Board proposes to disclose in the reformed audit report maps directly to auditor 
characteristics of independence and competence. The focal point of my study is ascertaining 
whether the proposed disclosures alter judgments of the auditor such that the audit report 
becomes more informative and useful for non-professional investors’ decisions. 
I address my research questions using an experiment. I recruit proxies for non-
professional investors through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform (Koonce, Miller, and 
Winchel 2015), who review summary financial information as well as the related audit reports 
for two companies and then complete a questionnaire eliciting their judgments about auditor 
attributes and their willingness to invest in the two companies. This study adopts a 3 × (2 × 2) × 
2 mixed design. The design first manipulates, between-participants, whether the audit report 
includes the PCAOB’s proposed independence disclosure, an alternate description of auditor 
independence, or no disclosure of auditor independence. Exploring alternate definitions of 
auditor independence is important because independence is typically defined in two parts – 
“independence of mind” and “independence in appearance.” As evidenced by the language in the 
PCAOB’s proposed Auditor’s Reporting Model (ARM), which focuses on independence rules 
(PCAOB 2013), the Board made a decision to describe independence using language much more 
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aligned with independence in appearance than with independence of mind – while both 
definitions were viable options. 
My design also manipulates, between-participants, whether the audit report discloses the 
length of the auditor-client relationship and within-participants, whether the length of auditor 
tenure is long or short. Examining judgments related to the length of the auditor-client 
relationship is central to studying audit report revision because practitioners, investors, and 
academicians harbor strong viewpoints either in support of or opposition to revealing this 
information in the audit report (PCAOB 2014). It is also important because peer regulators of the 
PCAOB have chosen alternative paths to address auditor tenure regulation.  
Finally, I also manipulate, between-participants, whether the audit report includes 
disclosure of a critical audit matter (CAM) or a disclosure that there is no CAM. A critical audit 
matter is described by the PCAOB as an account or area of management’s financial statements 
that the auditor deemed complex or subjective (PCAOB 2013). Although not a focal point of the 
study, I manipulate this additional disclosure in the audit report to examine whether the 
independence and tenure disclosures moderate the effect of CAM disclosures on investor 
judgments about the auditor and investment decisions. 
Findings confirm that the PCAOB’s proposed disclosures in the audit report influence 
non-professional investor judgments about auditor independence and competence, auditor 
credibility, audit quality, the informativeness of the audit report, and investment decisions. 
Perhaps most important, evidence from the experiment suggests that disclosing auditor tenure in 
the audit report positively influences investment when the disclosed tenure is long. Further, 
results suggest that including an explanation of auditor independence in the audit report also 
positively influences investment, while both disclosure of auditor independence and disclosure of 
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auditor tenure positively impact judgments about the audit report’s informativeness as well as 
auditor characteristics. Specifically, explaining auditor independence in the audit report elicits 
more positive judgments on auditor independence, auditor competence, audit quality, and auditor 
credibility than when absent from the report. Similarly, disclosing the length of auditor tenure 
prompts more positive assessment of auditor independence and audit report informativeness 
when tenure is short but more positive judgment of auditor competence and more positive 
investment when tenure is long. Also of note, there are no statistically significant interactions 
among the treatments on investment decisions; however, the independence disclosure and length 
of tenure do interact to promote higher auditor competence when independence is present and 
tenure is long. Together, my findings suggest that the judgement and decision-making processes 
of non-professional investors are influenced by the PCAOB’s proposed disclosures – suggesting 
that the Board’s reform endeavors appear to enhance perceptions of the financial statement 
auditor and the audit report as well as investment in auditees. 
I further explore the effects measured variables of auditor independence and auditor 
competence have on investment decisions as mediated by measurements of auditor credibility 
and audit quality using a moderated-mediation analysis from Hayes (2013). I discover that 
judgments of both auditor independence and competence have a significantly positive influence 
on judgments of both auditor credibility and audit quality. However, I do not find that judgments 
of auditor independence and auditor competence depend upon one another in enhancing auditor 
credibility (or audit quality). Rather, each uniquely augments the strength of auditor credibility 
and audit quality. Most important, evidence suggests that investor judgments about auditor 
independence, auditor credibility, and audit quality significantly influence investment decision-
making. I also observe that the relationships between investment decision-making and auditor 
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credibility as well as audit quality are positive – indicating that higher perceptions of auditor 
credibility and audit quality spur more positive investment. This analysis implies that to the 
extent information provided by the audit report increases non-professional investor confidence in 
auditor independence, investors view the auditor as more credible as well as the audit of higher 
quality, and more positive assessments of each result in more positive investment in auditees. 
The findings from this study are important specifically to the PCAOB because the results 
aid in understanding the impact of the regulator’s proposed revisions to the audit report. More 
specifically, this study provides clarity around many of the pointed regulatory questions sought 
by the Board of its constituents through its August 2013 audit standard proposal (PCAOB 2013). 
In addition, the observations of the particular participants recruited for this experiment are 
important to regulators because regulators often express concern over changes to financial 
reporting that could influence non-professional investors. This is due to the notion that non-
professional investors presumably have limited access to information (in comparison to 
institutional investors) and to attain additional information for investing purposes is likely time-
consuming and cost-prohibitive. Most important, the results of this study advocate that non-
professional investors are sensitive to the new information proposed for the audit report.  
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows: the next section provides a 
discussion on the regulatory environment and reveals the study’s hypotheses. The subsequent 
sections explain the experimental design and related participant task. Following those sections, I 
present results and related statistical analyses. Thereafter, the paper concludes with a discussion 
of the predicted implications as well as future research. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Regulatory Environment and Reform to the Audit Report  
The public company audit report has undergone very little revision to its content and 
structure over the last few decades – leading to its scrutiny today by regulators, investors, 
practitioners, and academicians.
1
 By design, the current pass/fail model of the report is structured 
such that deviation from the model is readily noticeable to report readers; however, critics of the 
current model argue that the audit report possesses merely symbolic value to financial statement 
users because the current content limits a report reader’s understanding of the auditor and the 
audit function (Church, Davis, and McCracken 2008).  
 In 2011, the PCAOB issued the “Concept Release on Possible Revisions to PCAOB 
Standards Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements” (ARM Concept Release) to 
solicit constituent feedback on revision to the audit report. The ARM Concept Release received 
248 comment letter responses from many different constituent groups. The Board noted that the 
overarching theme to the feedback suggested that the auditor has significant self-insight as well 
knowledge of his/her client; thus, the audit report should reflect that understanding to make it 
useful to investment decision-making (PCAOB 2013). Specifically, the comment letters call for 
disclosure of additional information in the report, where the pass/fail model is retained but 
supplemented with discussion about the auditor and the audit of the company’s financial 
statements. In an effort to address these concerns, the PCAOB proposes that 
                                                          
1
 Two modifications to the audit report are a product of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), where regulators 
altered the report by inserting a reference to the PCAOB and establishing reporting guidelines for the integrated 
audit (PCAOB 2011). 
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revision to the audit report may increase its relevance for investment decision-making (PCAOB 
2011; PCAOB 2013). 
As proposed, the ARM standard requires that the auditor include in the audit report 
explicit statements regarding its obligation to remain independent of its client as well as the 
length of time served as the company’s financial statement auditor. Further, the PCAOB suggests 
that disclosing critical audit matters will allow financial statement users to pinpoint areas of 
management’s financial statements that auditors deem complex or subjective (PCAOB 2013). 
Working together, the PCAOB suggests these disclosures will “increase the informational value 
of the auditor’s report to promote the usefulness and relevance of the audit and the related 
auditor’s report” (PCAOB 2013, 5) and may potentially impact capital allocation (PCAOB 
2011). Peer audit regulators such as the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB), Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of the United Kingdom (UK), and the European 
Commission (EC) are also actively engaged in modifying their respective audit reports. The 
regulators generally agree on the disclosure of areas of complex auditor judgment (i.e., critical 
audit matters, key audit matters) in the audit report; however, treatment varies concerning the 
disclosures related to auditor independence and auditor tenure. The respective audit regulators 
deviate in how they approach disclosing independence in the audit report (either including or 
excluding it from the report) but differ tremendously on the regulatory approach surrounding the 
regulation of auditor tenure. For example, the IAASB elected not to require any form of tenure 
disclosure in the audit report nor the financial filings (IAASB 2015). Further, while there is no 
tenure disclosure requirement, the EC mandated audit firm rotation every 10 years beginning in 
2016 for publicly traded entities (every twenty-five years for those that engage in retendering). 
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On the other hand, the PCAOB experienced significant criticism in its failed attempt to introduce 
discussion of mandatory audit rotation in the United States (US) (Whitehouse 2013).  
Some regulators have considered tenure disclosures outside the audit report. For example, 
the FRC requires that publicly listed companies in the UK provide information on auditor tenure 
length in the audit committee section of the annual report filing (PCAOB 2013). Similarly, the 
United States (US) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is currently exploring the option 
of disclosing auditor tenure in the audit committee report (SEC 2015).  
The Big Four accounting firms as well as the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) have also 
expressed opinions on the ARM proposal’s revisions to the audit report. Collectively, the Big 
Four and the CAQ agree that adding statements to clarify auditor independence and describe 
critical audit matters is appropriate for and relevant to the report. Each describes a laundry-list of 
changes they believe are requisite for the critical audit matters discussion; however, none suggest 
a change to the wording of the independence disclosure. At the same time, all five organizations 
adamantly oppose the disclosure of auditor tenure in the audit report, where each explicitly states 
the same rationale for its exclusion – empirical evidence does not support a conclusion that 
longer tenure leads to lower audit quality and thus the disclosure is unnecessary. Further, all 
submit that the PCAOB should only consider mandating a tenure disclosure in the PCAOB’s 
Form 2 or in the audit committee’s report, eliminating the chance financial statement users focus 
on the length of the relationship in the audit report and make potentially unwarranted inferences 
(CAQ 2013, Deloitte 2013, Ernst and Young 2013, KPMG 2013, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2013).
2
  
                                                          
2
 Firms registered with the PCAOB are required to complete an annual assessment of their respective firm 
structures, known as the PCAOB’s “Form 2.”  The form updates the regulator with various firm information 
including but not limited to the previous year’s billings related to publicly traded companies, firm personnel 
changes, and client changes.   
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Effects of Auditor Characteristics on Perceptions of Auditor Credibility and Audit Quality 
During a meeting with PCAOB Board members in 2010, members of the Board’s 
Investor Advisory Group (IAG) specified that more transparency surrounding the auditor and the 
auditing process would lead to less uncertainty from investors and would likely result in more 
confidence in the capital market system (PCAOB 2011). In the ARM Proposal, the PCAOB 
required of constituents whether clarification in the audit report regarding the auditor’s 
responsibility to remain independent of its client (in addition to maintaining “independent” in the 
report’s title) would be informative and useful for investors. Constituents affirmed that including 
a “strong” statement concerning auditor independence in the audit report would be useful in 
decision-making (PCAOB 2013). Regarding the disclosure of auditor tenure, the Board elected 
to remain agnostic concerning the impact of the disclosure – the regulator asserts disclosing 
auditor tenure is an attempt to acquiesce investor requests for the information. However, 
disclosing this information does satisfy a goal of the PCAOB to provide public company 
stakeholders with auditor continuance information. 
The Board believes that revealing previously undisclosed information about the audit 
function in the audit report “could lead to more efficient markets and improved allocations of 
capital,” (PCAOB 2011, 2). In the PCAOB’s ARM proposal, the agency suggests that the 
proposed new elements in the audit report are in fact “similar to an indication of the character of 
the auditor’s work,” (PCAOB 2013, A5-4). As demonstrated in the psychology and accounting 
literature, disclosures that reveal characteristics of independence and competence presumably 
will influence perceptions of auditor credibility and audit quality and thus will likely impact the 
decision-making of audit report readers. 
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Auditor Credibility 
First noted by Bentham's theory of evidence in 1827, the credibility of an information 
source is recognized as an integral part in determining the strength of the source’s 
communication – where characteristics such as rank, power, or official function add credibility to 
a source. Principally, source credibility theory suggests that people are more likely to be 
persuaded by communication from a source that offers itself as credible; here, credibility is noted 
as the “believability” or “reliability” of the information source (Hovland and Weiss 1951; 
Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953). In a seminal study on source credibility, Hovland et al. (1953) 
argue that trustworthiness and expertise are the two primary motivating factors that underpin 
perceptions of a source’s credibility, where the authors state “in any given case, the weight given 
a communicator’s assertions by his audience will depend on upon both of these factors” 
(Hovland et al. 1953, 2). The authors further note that perceptions of objectivity establish a 
source’s trustworthiness while perceptions of the source’s relative experience convey the 
expertise of a source. Other credibility studies in the psychology literature further corroborate 
that information sources that exude strong qualities of trustworthiness and expertise induce 
stronger positive attitudes toward positions for which they support (e.g., Greenberg and 
Tannenbaum 1961; Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt 1978; Pornpitakpan 2004).  
Specific to accounting research, a host of studies explore the judgment and decision-
making processes of accounting information users when certain characteristics related to an 
information source’s credibility are disclosed. The phenomenon has received extensive 
consideration in the literature through studies on credibility within the external audit team; 
between the external auditor and the internal audit function; between the external auditor and 
client management; and between investors and attestors. Here, studies focus on exploring the 
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credibility of information sources by manipulating attributes of either competence (e.g., Bamber 
1983; Rebele et al. 1988; Anderson et al. 1994; Murphy and Yetmar 1996) or independence (e.g., 
Joyce and Biddle 1981; Abdel-Khalik et al. 1983; Plumlee 1985; Caster and Pincus 1996; 
Goodwin 1999; Reimers and Fennema 1999; Christensen et al. 2014). Regarding the audit team, 
Bamber (1983) addresses source credibility by exploring the judgment of audit managers on the 
reliability of audit seniors in relationship to their level of experience. The study suggests that as 
an audit senior’s competence decreases so does an audit manager’s reliance on the senior’s work, 
where managers were found to be more likely to rely on the work of seniors with higher 
technical ability. Similarly, Anderson et al. (1994) notes that external auditors also evaluate audit 
evidence based on the perceived competence of the client preparing the information, where 
managers with more formal training and experience were noted as more competent and thus 
more credible. Manipulating competence in a different manner, Murphy and Yetmar (1996) find 
that audit supervisors reviewing audit evidence are more likely to assign higher credibility to the 
conclusions of subordinates who use the assistance of an expert system when assessing audit 
evidence. 
The extant literature also centers on credibility’s independence component. Joyce and 
Biddle (1981) find that when recalculating a client’s accounts receivable allowance, external 
auditors place significantly more trust in collection information from an independent rating 
agency than from a management estimate. Further corroborating external auditor’s sensitivity to 
the independence of provided audit evidence, Goodwin (1999) notes that auditors place more 
emphasis on audit evidence obtained from an outside source than an inside source (i.e., evidence 
provided by an external party versus client management). Along the same lines, Abdel-khalik et 
al. (1983) submits that the reporting structure of the internal audit staff (i.e., controller or audit 
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committee) and attributed credibility plays the largest role in an external auditor’s audit planning 
around risky accounts such as accounts receivable and accounts payable. Caster and Pincus 
(1996) argue that, as perceived independence of the information source increases, information 
providers are viewed as more credible and as result audit evidence becomes more persuasive to 
external auditors. Reimers and Fennema (1999) suggest that external auditors assessing 
management estimates illustrate different sensitivities to the independence and credibility of an 
information source – depending upon their role in the audit process. Those reviewing audit work 
are more likely to place a higher emphasis on the independence of an information source than 
those who initially assess management’s estimates. Last, Christensen et al. (2014) find support 
that investors attend to negative information more when that information is provided by 
independent auditors than management because investors perceive external auditors as more 
credible information providers. 
Very few studies have examined both of the credibility components simultaneously (e.g. 
Brown 1983; Schneider 1985; Rebele et al. 1988; Hirst 1994). Related to the relationship 
between internal auditors and external auditors, both Brown (1983) and Schneider (1985) 
observed the perception of the internal audit function’s competence and independence as noted 
by professional external auditors – with each study finding one of the components more integral 
than the other to the credibility of a source. For example, Brown (1983) finds that external 
auditors attribute more credibility to the internal audit function based on the degree of 
independence from management more so than the previous work experience of the internal 
auditors. On the other hand, Schneider (1985) suggests that external auditors generally view the 
experience of internal auditors as more important than the level of independence from 
management when determining how much reliance to put on the internal audit function. 
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Similarly, findings from Rebele et al. (1988) suggest that external auditors are more sensitive to 
the work experience of an information source more so than its degree of independence from 
management when determining the credibility of the information provider. Hirst (1994) finds 
that both source competence and independence influence an external auditor’s perception of an 
information source’s credibility; however, most interesting, the author notes that an interaction 
exists between the two attributes of the information source. Here, the author finds that audit 
support is viewed as more diagnostic by external auditors when both the competence and 
independence of an information source are high while the inferential value of audit evidence 
decreases when either characteristic is reduced. 
Specifically related to investor use of accounting information, investment decision-
making is enhanced when a credible intermediary attests to information (Kinney 2000). Mercer 
(2004) also suggests that investors rely on the credibility of external assurance when making 
investment decisions, where testimony from auditors augments the reliability of financial 
information. Other studies suggest that management disclosures receiving auditor attestation are 
deemed more credible by financial analysts and bankers when making investment decisions 
(Libby 1979; Hodge 2001). Further, investors have been noted to respond more intensely to the 
earnings releases of corporations who engage larger international accounting firms for their 
financial statement audits more so than companies who engage smaller firms – an indicator of 
the role perceived auditor credibility plays in decision-making (Teoh and Wong 1993). In 
general, assurance provided by an external auditor induces a sense of credibility for the 
information which helps to alleviate some uncertainty that an investor might have in processing 
information (Thayer 2011).  
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Audit Quality 
Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, and Velury (2013) suggest that the presence (or 
absence) of certain auditor attributes, explicitly independence and competence, defines the 
quality of an external audit. The authors lean on the generally accepted DeAngelo (1981) 
definition of audit quality as a combination of the auditor’s wherewithal to detect and report a 
misstatement, where the ability of an auditor detecting a misstatement is linked to its level of 
competence while subsequently acting on the finding is likened to its degree of independence. 
Throughout the accounting literature, the primary driver of an auditor’s independence is noted as 
his/her ability to remain independent of management while the chief catalyst in development of 
competence is accumulating engagement-specific audit knowledge – both of which are 
inherently associated with the length of auditor tenure (Knechel et al. 2013).  
Regulators often highlight the importance of user confidence in an independent, objective 
auditing process because it induces higher perceptions of audit quality and also encourages 
greater confidence in the unqualified audit opinion (Ghosh and Moon 2005). Academic research 
further advocates that auditors independent of management promote a more robust audit 
function, largely through enhanced perceptions of objectivity and professional skepticism 
(DeAngelo 1981; Knechel et al. 2013). Tepalagul and Lin (2015) describe two general views of 
audit tenure’s effect on audit quality: 1) in a protracted auditor-client relationship, auditors tend 
to become like-minded with management, which impairs independence and audit quality and 2) 
lengthy auditor-client relationships increase business acumen and audit expertise, which 
increases competence and audit quality. Essentially, the tenure-quality debate hinges on a trade-
off between professional skepticism and domain specific knowledge (Knechel et al. 2013). Thus, 
audit quality is purportedly depressed in one of two ways by the length of the audit-client 
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relationship – reduced expert knowledge of the client (competence) as implied by short tenure or 
impaired independence as insinuated by long tenure (Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds 2002).  
As previously discussed, a common association with length of auditor tenure and audit 
quality is attributed to the learning curve that exists between the client and the auditor. Regarding 
short tenure and expertise, Beck, Frecka, and Solomon (1988) conclude that during the early 
years of an audit engagement lack of domain specific knowledge reduces the chances of 
detecting material errors. Further, evidenced by larger abnormal accruals in the first few years 
following an auditor change, Johnson et al. (2002) determine that audit quality is lower in short 
audit tenure relationships while Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003) find that discretionary accruals 
are negatively associated with long tenure. Similarly, Manry, Mock, and Turner (2008) conclude 
that even long audit partner tenure is negatively associated with discretionary accruals. Related 
to investor perceptions, Ghosh and Moon (2005) explore how capital market participants view 
the length of audit tenure as affecting audit quality. The authors analyze the earnings quality 
judgments of three financial statement users: professional investors, independent rating agencies, 
and financial analysts. They find evidence advocating that all three groups perceive audit quality 
as improving with auditor tenure. 
Concerning length of tenure and independence, the primary argument for a reduction in 
audit quality is the development of a personal relationship between the firm and the client, where 
the relationship is purported to impact the auditor’s independence and related professional 
skepticism due to establishment of a loyal or emotive bond between the two parties. This type of 
relationship has a potential negative impact on the judgments made throughout the engagement 
through actions such as shelving innovative audit procedures, submitting to client pressure, or 
colluding with management (Carey and Simnett 2006). Abdolmohammadi and Wright (1987) 
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explore the relationship between auditor experience and the likelihood of an auditor issuing a 
qualified opinion or proposing an adjustment. The authors find an inverse relationship with 
tenure for both. Similarly, Dopuch, King, and Schwartz (2003) find that shorter tenure results in 
auditors that are less willing to issue favorably biased opinions of managements’ financial 
statements. On the other hand, regarding the reported positive effects of prolonged audit tenure 
on independence, Solomon, Shields, and Whittington (1999) note that as auditor tenure grows 
auditors develop robust knowledge of clients. Thus, they rely less on management assessments 
and become more independent. Also, in reviewing company bankruptcies, Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2002) find that auditors with long tenure are more likely to issue a going-concern 
opinion prior to bankruptcy than auditors with short tenure. Further, Bowlin, Hobson, and 
Piercey (2015) find when auditors are prompted to be more skeptical, more frequent audit 
rotation results in lower audit quality. 
Auditor Disclosures on Non-professional Investor Judgment and Decision-Making 
The PCAOB proposes introducing new information in the audit report will assist 
investors when making investment decisions, where the Board acknowledges that the 
information in the ARM proposal likely characterizes the audit (PCAOB 2013). As noted above, 
a well-vetted stream of accounting literature suggests that auditing decision-makers rely more on 
auditing information provided by sources thought to possess higher degrees of competence and 
independence than those that are perceived as less competent and less independent. This occurs 
because those perceived to exhibit robust attributes of independence and competence are viewed 
as more credible. This phenomenon likely extends to investors. Disclosure of the auditor’s 
obligation to remain independent of its client in the audit report will likely change the level of 
confidence investors have in an auditor’s independence while a disclosure in the audit report 
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revealing length of auditor tenure will presumably adjust investor perception of both auditor 
competence and auditor independence. As a result of altering the perception of an external 
auditor’s credibility through revealing information about the auditor’s independence and 
competence, consequent investment decisions are also likely influenced. Along the same lines, 
accounting research provides that accounting information users appreciate the value of high 
quality external auditing, where quality is generally dependent upon the level of the auditor’s 
independence and competence.  
Presently, the only independence indicator in the auditor’s report to a financial statement 
user is in the title of the audit report. Auditor tenure is not currently disclosed in any involuntary 
capacity. However, as proposed, the ARM standard will reveal these characteristics to investors 
through the audit report. As a consequence, the disclosures will likely alter an investor’s 
perception of auditor credibility and audit quality as well as related investment decisions. 
Main Effect of Auditor Independence Disclosure 
Currently, the audit report communicates very little specific information regarding the 
auditor’s resolve to remain independent of client management. The PCAOB presumes that 
defining auditor independence in the audit report will enhance a report reader’s understanding 
and awareness of the auditor’s obligation to remain independent of its client. Again, the Board 
(as well as its constituents) suggests disclosing auditor independence in the audit report for 
investors will be relevant to decision-making and could result in improvement of capital costs 
(PCAOB 2011; PCAOB 2013)  
The SEC and the AICPA have promulgated innumerate rulings intended to deter auditor 
behaviors by describing scenarios where auditors lack independence, but there is no consensus 
definition of auditor independence (Kinney 1999). The AICPA’s code of professional conduct 
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explains that the concept of auditor independence consists of two elements – independence of 
mind and independence in appearance. The organization describes independence through the first 
element, stating that the independent auditor’s state of mind is “one that permits a member to 
perform an attest service without being affected by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism,” (AICPA 2015, 11). The second element, independence in appearance, 
reminds professional accountants that they should avoid circumstances that may cause an 
objective party to believe independence of mind is compromised. 
Tversky and Koeler (1994)’s Support Theory implies that the judged probability of an 
event occurring is contingent on the explicitness of the event’s description, where different 
framing of the event can alter the perceived likelihood of its outcome (Johnson, Hershey, 
Meszaros, and Kunreuther 1993; Rottenstrieich and Tversky 1997; Brenner 2003; Bowlin, 
Hobson, and Piercey 2015). The theory is underpinned by the supposition that judgmental 
heuristics such as representativeness and availability impact the salience of an event’s outcome 
thus influencing impressions and decision-making (Hammersley, Bamber, and Carpenter 2010). 
For example, in a study on flight insurance policies, Johnson et al. (1993) find that participants 
are willing to pay more for insurance when the policy contains an explicit list of covered events 
(e.g., mechanical failure or terrorism) compared to an exhaustive policy that does not describe 
specific coverage. In sum, the authors hypothesize and discover that participants exposed to 
explicit outcomes of flight disaster trigger a decision maker’s availability heuristic, which greatly 
enhances the perceived value of flight insurance. 
The addition of a robust independence explanation in the audit report is central to a report 
reader’s perception of auditor independence (Olazabal and Almer 2001; Kaplan and Mauldin 
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2008). In its ARM proposal, the PCAOB mandates that the auditor describe its independence 
obligation in the audit report to financial statement users as remaining “independent with respect 
to the company in accordance with the United States federal securities laws and the applicable 
rules of the SEC and the PCAOB,” (PCAOB 2013, A1-4). Judgments of auditor independence 
are likely impacted by the explanation of the auditor’s obligation to remain independent of its 
client, where the explicitness of the independence definition in the audit report will likely frame 
a report reader’s support for available scenarios where an auditor is or is not independent.  
I propose the PCAOB’s compliance-oriented “independence in appearance” explanation 
(compared to the much more implicit conceptual “independence of mind” definition) is more 
likely to trigger a report reader’s psychological support for scenarios where an auditor was not 
compliant and thus was not independent – support such as major financial accounting scandals 
(e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Waste Management, Madoff Investment Securities, etc.). If so, the 
ARM’s proposed independence disclosure likely undermines the Board’s attempt to increase 
financial statement users’ perceptions of auditor independence, and it may behoove the PCAOB 
to explain auditor independence in the audit report through the concept-oriented independence of 
mind definition. 
I expect that to the extent a non-professional investor attends to an independence 
disclosure, the audit report becomes more informative regarding auditor independence, auditor 
credibility, audit quality, and consequently investment decisions. Therefore, I anticipate more 
positive investment will occur when independence is disclosed in the audit report compared to 
when the disclosure is absent. However, the Support Theory literature suggests that the explicit 
nature of the PCAOB’s independence definition may cause report readers to draw on scenarios 
where an auditor may not have been perceived as independent. That said, I expect that a 
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compliance-oriented “independence in appearance” description of auditor independence will 
encourage non-professional investors to envision settings where an auditor has broken rules and 
as a result is perceived as less independent. This will result in less positive investment compared 
to when participants receive the concept-oriented “independence of mind” definition. Formally, I 
predict: 
H1a: The disclosure of the auditor’s obligation to remain independent in the audit 
report will result in more positive investment by non-professional investors 
compared to when the disclosure is absent from the report. 
H1b: A compliance-oriented “independence in appearance” explanation of 
auditor independence in the audit report will result in less positive investment by 
non-professional investors compared to a concept-oriented “independence of 
mind” explanation. 
Main Effect of Auditor Tenure Disclosure 
Constituents advised the PCAOB that revealing “key engagement statistics” about the 
auditor would provide report readers with a sense of the auditor’s level of expertise as well as the 
audit team’s accumulated knowledge of the client (PCAOB 2011). Noted among those requested 
statistics is length of the auditor-client relationship. The crux of the auditor tenure debate is how 
the disclosure will be perceived by report readers and what inferences about auditor 
independence may develop as a result of revealing this information (Knechel et al. 2013). Francis 
(2004) suggests that audit firms have strong economic incentives and robust mechanisms to 
withstand management influence and maintain independence – mandatory rotation of audit 
partners and managers, engagement quality review partners, audit committee control over 
continuance, PCAOB inspection and enforcement, and avoidance of reputation damage and 
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costly litigation. While independence can be monitored and controlled through aforementioned 
regulation and audit firms incentives, it is not possible to generate client-specific expertise prior 
to engaging a client. Obtaining this knowledge base is integral because it is noted to have 
substantial positive effects on the quality of the financial statement audit. For example, increased 
auditor competence promotes efficiency in assessment of audit risk, detection of misstatements, 
discovery of internal control deficiencies, performance of analytical procedures, and adherence 
to professional auditing and accounting standards (Knechel et al. 2013). That said, even if 
lengthy audit tenure results in auditors rebuffing their own incentives and mechanisms and 
establishing an inappropriate relationship with a client, the impact of lost professional skepticism 
is likely offset by accumulated audit knowledge (Lim and Tan 2010). 
The PCAOB remains agnostic on how its proposed audit tenure disclosure in the audit 
report may benefit the decision-making of investors (PCAOB 2013). Further, inconsistent 
evidence in the audit quality literature suggests that a reader may react to tenure length 
unpredictably. On one hand, exposure to length of tenure influences how a reader interprets 
auditor competence; on the other hand, exposure to length of tenure also affects how a reader 
assesses auditor independence. Most likely, length of tenure induces a reader to consider both 
auditor attributes simultaneously – resulting in some trade-off between perceived independence 
and competence (Knechel et al. 2013). However, the effect the trade-off has on judgments of the 
auditor, auditor credibility, audit quality and related investment decisions is not fully 
substantiated. Therefore, I make no prediction on the influence variation in tenure length will 
have on the investment decisions of non-professional investors.
3
 Stated in the null, I predict: 
                                                          
3
 Length of tenure is manipulated in this study at two levels – 2 and 25 years. For short tenure, 2 years was chosen to 
establish continuity of two balance sheet audits.  The average tenure length for the largest 100 and 500 publicly 
traded companies (based on market capitalization) in the United States is approximately 28 and 21 years 
(respectively); thus, 25 years was chosen for long tenure (PCAOB 2011). 
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H2: Variation in the length of tenure in the audit report will have no impact on the 
investment decisions of non-professional investors. 
Interaction of Auditor Independence and Tenure Disclosures 
Again, in the PCAOB’s ARM proposal, the Board asserts that the new elements to be 
included in the audit report are in fact “similar to an indication of the character of the auditor’s 
work,” (PCAOB 2013, A5-4). However, how non-professional investors will respond to 
simultaneous exposure of the auditor’s responsibility to remain independent and variation in 
length of auditor tenure is unsubstantiated. Following the findings of Ghosh and Moon (2005), I 
anticipate that a disclosure explaining auditor independence in the audit report accompanied by a 
tenure length disclosure will result in non-professional investors viewing the combined 
disclosures as increasing independence while simultaneously dictating how a non-professional 
investor views auditor competence. Working together, I expect that a long tenure disclosure will 
strengthen perception of competence while an accompanying independence explanation will curb 
any uncertainty a report reader has with long tenure affecting the auditor’s obligation to remain 
independent of management, which will result in a more positive effect on investment than when 
short tenure is disclosed alongside an independence explanation. Formally, I predict: 
H3: Disclosing long tenure alongside an independence disclosure will result in 
more positive investment by non-professional investors compared to when short 
tenure is disclosed. 
Interaction of Auditor Independence, Auditor Tenure, and Critical Audit Matters Disclosures 
 
The PCAOB (as well as other audit regulators) believes that disseminating additional 
information on subjective, complex auditor judgment will help report readers focus on the 
financial statement areas that were noted as challenging to the auditor. In turn, the discussion 
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would allow investors to evaluate more closely the associated financial statement accounts, 
which should also increase the communicative value of the audit report for investment decisions 
(PCAOB 2013). Similarly, while each describes a laundry-list of changes they believe are 
requisite for the critical audit matters disclosure, the Big Four and the CAQ agree that the 
disclosure is appropriate for and relevant to the audit report.  
The PCAOB’s proposed revision to the audit report regarding critical audit matter 
discussion has two distinct parts. The first part is a paragraph which sets forth that the auditor 
must communicate his/her requirement to report critical audit matters or otherwise state that 
there are no critical audit matters. The paragraph then proceeds to describe critical audit matters 
to report readers as “those matters addressed during the audit that (1) involved the most difficult, 
subjective, or complex auditor judgments; (2) posed the most difficulty to the auditor in 
obtaining sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed the most difficulty to the auditor in 
forming the opinion on the financial statements,” (PCAOB 2013, 15). The second part of the 
CAM disclosure is a separate paragraph that acknowledges and discusses the critical audit matter 
or alternatively a statement from the auditor that reports there is no critical audit matter.  
Regarding accounting research surrounding the PCAOB’s proposed ARM standard, most 
of the fanfare has been concentrated on the disclosure of critical audit matters. Backof, Bowlin, 
and Goodson (2014) find that discussing critical audit matters in the audit report influences 
jurors insomuch that they are more likely to find that auditors are negligent in an audit when the 
audit report identifies and discloses procedures that are performed to address critical audit 
matters. Brasel, Doxey, Grenier, and Reffett (2016) suggest that critical audit matters can 
actually provide litigation protection to auditors due to enhancing a juror’s ability to recognize a 
plaintiff’s foreseeability of misstatement. In contrast, while Brown, Majors, and Peecher (2014) 
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find that critical audit matters do not have an adverse effect on increasing juror damage awards, 
the authors note that disclosing critical audit matters to jurors reduces their negligence 
assessments of auditors. Related to non-professional investors, Kachelmeier, Schmidt, and 
Valentine (2014) find that non-professional investor perception of auditor responsibility and 
liability for a misstatement is curbed when CAM disclosures match the area of the misstatement. 
In addition, the authors discover that CAM disclosures result in lower financial statement user 
confidence in the financial statement area associated with the CAM. Evidence from Christensen 
et al. (2014) also suggests that the presence of CAMs in the audit report influences the judgment 
and decision-making of non-professional investors. The authors note that a non-professional 
investor is less likely to invest in a company when it receives an audit report with a CAM 
paragraph relative to a CAM explained through a management footnote. Assumptions of the 
study infer that non-professional investors attribute higher credibility to an auditor as a source of 
information; as such, when negative information is provided by an auditor (as opposed to 
management), they attend to the negative information more. This results in a reduction of 
investment. 
Limited accounting research exists to describe how report readers will react to the audit 
report containing both critical audit matters as well as information that defines the character of 
the auditor. However, the extant psychology and accounting literature on credibility suggests 
information sources that exhibit traits of strong independence and competence are noted by 
information users as more credible. Similarly, the audit quality literature indicates that audit 
quality is underpinned by robust traits of auditor independence and competence. The PCAOB 
acknowledges that the disclosures proposed in the ARM reflect characteristics of the auditor and 
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his/her work (PCAOB 2013). As such, I expect that revealing these characteristics in concert 
with the communication of a critical audit matter will influence investment decisions.  
As previously discussed, the PCAOB presumes that disclosing the auditor’s obligation to 
be independent in the audit report will enhance a report reader’s understanding and awareness of 
auditor independence. Christensen et al. (2014) suggest discussing CAMs in the audit report 
results in non-professional investors reducing their investment – as a result of participants 
attending to negative information more because the information source is perceived as both more 
independent and credible. Following exposure to the auditor independence disclosure, I 
anticipate that non-professional investors will exude greater confidence in auditor independence, 
auditor credibility, and audit quality. As a result of the auditor appearing more truthful to an 
investor in reporting information, the critical audit matter will become more salient. As such, I 
anticipate that the presence of the independence disclosures alongside the CAM disclosure will 
result in less positive investment compared to when the independence disclosure is absent from 
the audit report. 
Exposure to the auditor tenure disclosure will also likely influence investor judgments of 
auditor independence, auditor competence, auditor credibility, and audit quality. However, I 
expect that investors will use length of auditor tenure to assess auditor competence surrounding 
the critical audit matter and not necessarily to assess auditor independence. I presume that 
investor attention will focus on auditor competence because an investor may assume an auditor is 
inherently independent if the auditor discloses a critical audit matter. As such, the relative 
strength of the auditor competence attribute will likely influence the impact a CAM disclosure 
has on non-professional investor investment decision-making. I anticipate that long tenure will 
likely spur higher perception of auditor competence, auditor credibility, and audit quality thereby 
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reducing the salience of the CAM. In turn, more positive investment will occur when tenure is 
long compared to when it is short. Formally: 
H4a: The disclosure of the auditor’s obligation to remain independent in the audit 
report alongside a critical audit matter disclosure will result in less positive 
investment compared to when the audit report does not disclose the auditor’s 
obligation to remain independent. 
H4b: The disclosure of long tenure in the audit report alongside a critical audit 
matter disclosure will result in more positive investment compared to when short 
tenure is disclosed. 
Additional Analyses 
As previously noted, prior psychology and accounting literature suggests that non-
professional investor judgments about auditor credibility and audit quality are likely altered if 
certain auditor characteristics are revealed in the audit report. The PCAOB’s proposed 
disclosures will map directly to auditor attributes of independence and competence and thus will 
presumably influence perceptions of the auditor’s credibility and the quality of his/her work. It is 
important to also examine these potential effects for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, the 
PCAOB requests feedback on whether or not any unintended consequences may arise as a result 
of revealing information about the auditor in an effort to inform the Board prior to the 
finalization (or re-proposal) of the ARM standard. Also, the Big Four and the CAQ specifically 
insinuate that disclosing auditor tenure in the audit report will negatively impact perceived 
auditor independence and as a result audit quality. Further, prior accounting literature is mixed 
on the influence lengthy tenure has on perception of the audit as well as the auditors. The 
contextual setting of this study allows for an opportunity to explore how judgments of auditor 
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characteristic link to judgments of auditor credibility and audit quality but ultimately how those 
judgments directly and indirectly spur investment decisions. 
Therefore, after exposure to the treatment conditions, I capture non-professional investor 
judgments of auditor independence and auditor competence as well as auditor credibility and 
audit quality. In separate supplemental analyses, I examine the conditional direct effects that 
judgments of independence and competence have on the extent of investment, where I also 
examine the conditional indirect effects the judgments of independence and competence have the 
extent of investment as mediated through judgments of auditor credibility and audit quality. I 
complete this analysis using Hayes (2013)’s moderated-mediation PROCESS model.4 
Although not formally hypothesized, I propose that judgments of auditor competence will 
moderate the direct effect of auditor independence on investment decisions as well as the indirect 
effect of auditor independence judgments through both auditor credibility and audit quality on 
investment decisions. Following Ghosh and Moon (2005), I believe the mediating influence of 
both auditor credibility and audit quality on investment decisions will become more robust for 
each as judgments of independence and competence grow stronger. 
  
                                                          
4
 According to Hayes (2013), using a set of ordinary least square regressions (as employed by Hayes’ PROCESS 
model) for estimating observed mediation models is as appropriate as using structural equation modeling. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Participants 
Participants for the study are recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (TURK) 
proprietary data collection service.
5
 Following prior research using TURK participants as non-
professional investors in judgment and decision-making experiments (e.g., Koonce et al. 2015), I 
filter TURK participants by requiring they affirm that they have: 1) experience in reading 
financial statements and 2) completed at least two college level accounting and/or finance 
courses.
6
 After being filtered based on these criteria in Qualtrics, participants are routed into the 
experiment to complete the instrument. Total participants in the study came to 926, and each 
participant was compensated $1.00 for their participation – resulting in a $5.11 hourly rate. 
Experimental Procedure 
I employ a 3 × (2 × 2) × 2 mixed experimental design that manipulates three variables: 
independence disclosure, tenure disclosure, and critical audit matter disclosure. Specifically, the 
purpose of this study is to examine whether disclosures regarding financial statement auditor 
independence and tenure alter non-professional investor judgments of auditor characteristics 
insomuch that the disclosures influence judgments of the auditor and the audit and consequent 
                                                          
5
 TURK can yield high-quality data collection by custom screening participants for desired attributes (e.g., age, sex, 
experience).  The service is capable of delivering many similar research benefits as using Masters of Business 
Administration (MBA) students as proxies for non-professional investors (Brandon, Long, Loraas, Mueller-Phillips, 
and Vansant 2014). 
 
6
 Using participants recruited from TURK, Koonce et al. (2015) replicate the results of non-professional investors’ 
reaction to management’s use of derivatives in Koonce, Lipe, and McAnally (2008), where the authors used MBA 
students as proxies for non-professional investors.  As suggested by Brandon et al. (2014), Koonce et al. (2015) 
verify that if appropriate screening questions are employed when recruiting from TURK then the participants are 
reasonable proxies for non-professional investors.  
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investment decision-making. Therefore, I manipulate whether the audit report includes the 
PCAOB’s compliance-oriented “independence in appearance” definition, an alternate concept- 
oriented “independence of mind” definition, or no disclosure regarding the auditor’s requirement 
to be independent of its client. I also manipulate, between-participants, whether the audit report 
discloses auditor tenure. In addition, I manipulate the length of auditor tenure within-participants 
at two levels – long auditor tenure (25 years) or short auditor tenure (2 years).7 Finally, I 
manipulate, between-participants, whether the audit report includes disclosure of a critical audit 
matter or a disclosure that there is no critical audit matter.  
The instrument first provides the participants with a short description of the study, its 
intentions, and the task. Upon accessing the instrument, participants receive basic background 
information concerning two hypothetical technology companies that are engaged in selling 
electronics to industrial consumers. Next, I provide specific financial statement information 
related to both companies – while implying that financial statement auditors would be attentive 
to these items.
8
 After reading the background material, participants receive two audit reports –
one for each company. The version of the audit reports depends on the treatment to which each 
participant has been randomly assigned. The audit reports remain on the screen throughout the 
remainder of the experiment. Prior to answering the experimental task questions, participants 
must complete pre-manipulation checks designed to direct attention to the elements of the audit 
report. 
                                                          
7
 The within-participants manipulation of auditor tenure length is counter-balanced in the task materials. 
 
8
 Of note, following the approach in Kachelmeier et al. (2014), participants receive relevant information related to 
the financial statements; however, they do not receive a full set of financial statements. I employ the same approach 
to create an environment that directs participant attention towards the information in the audit report, while still 
providing requisite financial statement information.    
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All versions of the report begin with the standard introductory paragraph; however, the 
structure of the report is manipulated thereafter. Following the introduction, a disclosure defining 
auditor independence is inserted and emphasized (absent in the control group) with an appended 
sentence at the end disclosing auditor tenure of 2 or 25 years (absent in the control group), which 
is also emphasized. Next, the basis of the opinion and a clean audit opinion are presented, and 
the opinion is emphasized. Last, additional information in the form of a critical audit matter is 
presented and emphasized (absent in the control group) preceded by the PCAOB’s language 
identifying the requirement to communicate the critical audit matter in the audit report. 
Participants answer experimental task questions while viewing both audit reports concurrently. 
These questions are designed to gauge their judgments of the auditor and the audit as well as 
their investment decision-making process. Questions pertaining to participant demographics 
follow. 
Manipulated variables
9
 
Auditor Independence 
I manipulate the independence disclosure in the audit report between participants across 
three conditions: 1) maintaining the current practice indicating an auditor’s independence in the 
report title only; 2) presenting a compliance-oriented “independence in appearance” disclosure 
(i.e., as proposed by the PCAOB’s ARM); and 3) presenting a concept-oriented “independence 
of mind” disclosure (i.e., as described by the AICPA’s Code of Conduct).  
The independence definition in the independence in appearance condition is “We are a 
public accounting firm registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”) (United States) and are required to be independent with respect to the [Company] 
                                                          
9
 See Appendix A for examples of the experimental task. 
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in accordance with the United States federal securities laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the PCAOB.” In the 
independence of mind condition the verbiage employed is “We are a public accounting firm 
registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) (United States) 
and are required to be independent in performing an audit without being affected by influences 
that compromise professional judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act with integrity and 
exercise objectivity and professional skepticism.” 
Auditor Tenure 
I manipulate the tenure disclosure between participants across two conditions as follows: 
1) maintaining current practice that does not indicate auditor tenure and 2) presenting an audit 
tenure length disclosure. I also manipulate the length of the tenure across two levels within-
participants, such that reported auditor tenure is two and twenty-five years – this manipulation is 
counterbalanced in the instrument. In the tenure absent condition, the length of tenure is not 
disclosed in the audit report or otherwise made known to participants. Specifically, in the tenure 
disclosure present treatment, tenure is disclosed as: “We or our predecessor firms have served as 
the [Company’s] auditor consecutively since 2013 (1990).” 
Critical Audit Matters 
Following the PCAOB’s language discussing the auditor’s requirement to communicate 
critical audit matters in the audit report, I manipulate the critical audit matter disclosure between 
participants under two conditions: 1) presenting a CAM disclosure (e.g., obsolescence of 
inventory) and 2) presenting a statement that there is no CAM to disclose (e.g., stating that the 
auditor determined there are no critical audit matters). The Board’s suggested required statement 
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for non-disclosure of a critical audit matter is “We determined that there are no critical audit 
matters.” The disclosure of the critical audit matter is presented as follows: 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that our evaluation of the Company’s 
inventory value was a critical audit matter in the audit of the Company’s financial 
statement as of and for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2014. Considerations 
that led to our determination included the following: The Company continues to 
experience increased competition with its “first generation” products which 
reduced revenue growth, sales prices and profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of the Company’s evaluation of the inventory 
value: (1) involved subjective auditor judgments in evaluating whether 
management’s judgments regarding the weight given to evidence of value is 
appropriate and (2) involved difficult auditor judgments in designing audit 
procedures to test the data underlying management’s impairment valuation. 
Dependent Measures 
To assess the influence of the proposed disclosures, I request participants rate their 
perceptions of auditor independence and competence based on the information communicated in 
the audit reports.
10
 Further, I request that participants make judgments concerning the credibility 
of the auditor and the quality of the audit. In addition, I ask the participants to opine on the 
informativeness of the audit report in their investment decisions. Last, I ask participants to make 
decisions regarding the likelihood they would invest in similar stocks of real companies as well 
as how they would allocate a hypothetical investment sum of $10,000 between the two 
respective auditees. Each of these judgments and/or decisions is captured using an 11 point 
Likert scale. 
                                                          
10
 Experimental task questions follow Lowe and Pany (1995). 
34 
 
Pre-Manipulation Checks 
In the pre-experimental questionnaire, I ask participants to answer two questions 
designed to assess their qualifications as a non-professional investor. Following the assessment, 
participants are required to identify the fiscal years under audit as well as the names of the two 
hypothetical companies and their respective auditing firms. Participants are then directed to 
identify the location of the CAM disclosure in the audit report. Depending upon the treatments 
each participant receives through random assignment, participants next identify the location of 
the independence disclosure as well as confirm the years of the audit-client relationship disclosed 
in the respective audit reports. Participants cannot proceed without answering all of the questions 
correctly. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Demographics 
Table 1 presents participant demographics. Of the 926 participants, 57 percent are male, 
43 percent are female, and the majority are between the ages of 26 and 44 (59 percent). Over 80 
percent of the participants indicate they have obtained a college degree, with 23 percent 
indicating some post-graduate study. Regarding occupation, 32 percent of participants specify 
their profession as related to finance or accounting, while 43 percent of participants state that 
they have 10 plus years of professional experience. In terms of trading activity, 399 of the 
participants (43 percent) indicate that they actively trade in a brokerage account.
11
  
  
                                                          
11
 In separate ANOVA tests, no significant relationships are noted between the participants’ provided demographic 
information and any of the dependent variables of interest. 
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TABLE 1 
Participant Demographics
a
 
         Participants 
 
926 100% 
 
Occupation Description 
  
 
     
Accounting 
 
198 21% 
Gender 
    
Finance 
 
98 11% 
Female 
 
396 43% 
 
Management 
 
168 18% 
Male 
 
530 57% 
 
Marketing 
 
57 6% 
     
Operations/Production 
 
109 12% 
Age (Years) 
    
Human Resources 
 
53 6% 
18 – 25  
 
172 19% 
 
Customer Service 
 
106 11% 
26 – 34  
 
375 40% 
 
Other 
 
137 15% 
35 – 44  
 
175 19% 
     45 – 54  
 
132 14% 
 
Active Trader 
   55 – 64  
 
56 6% 
 
Yes 
 
399 43% 
65 + 
 
16 2% 
 
No 
 
527 57% 
         Professional Experience 
    
Evaluate financial statements
b
 
   Less than 3 
 
133 14% 
 
Rarely 
 
37 9% 
3 – 5 
 
179 19% 
 
Occasionally 
 
118 30% 
6 – 10 
 
219 24% 
 
Usually 
 
144 36% 
11 – 15 
 
142 15% 
 
Always 
 
100 25% 
16 – 20 
 
94 10% 
     21 – 25 
 
71 8% 
 
Evaluate the audit report
b
 
   26 – 30 
 
40 4% 
 
Rarely 
 
108 27% 
Over 30 
 
48 5% 
 
Occasionally 
 
141 35% 
     
Usually 
 
93 23% 
Education Level 
    
Always 
 
57 14% 
Less than College 
 
31 3% 
 
 
   Some College 
 
134 14% 
     College Graduate 
 
550 59% 
     Some Postgraduate 
 
47 5% 
     Postgraduate 
 
164 18% 
                  
a. Consistent with Koonce et al. (2015), of the total 926 participants, all verify that they have experience reading 
financial statements and have taken at least two college-level accounting or finance classes. 
b. Participants indicated that they actively trade in a brokerage account.       
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Non-professional Investors’ Investment Decision-Making 
Tests of H1a and H1b 
To present the study’s analysis, the means for all experimental treatments are presented in 
Table 2; however, for all tests of formal hypotheses, the means are presented in Tables 3 and 5. 
In H1a and H1b, I predict that the presence of the PCAOB’s proposed independence disclosure 
in the audit report will result in more positive investment than when it is absent from the report, 
and also that the PCAOB’s proposed compliance-oriented “independence in appearance” 
definition will result in less positive investment than that of a concept-oriented “independence of 
mind” definition of independence. Tables 3 and 4 present the means and related standard 
deviations as well as the analysis of variance (ANOVA) model tests of the participants’ 
investment decision-making. In this test, the dependent variable, investment decision, is the 
likelihood the participant would invest separately in the two companies.
12
   
The full ANOVA model in Table 4 indicates that participants do invest more (F:1,918 = 
3.56; p = 0.06) when exposed to the auditor’s independence disclosure in the audit report (mean 
= 5.099) versus when it is absent (mean = 4.869). To further test H1a, I analyze a restricted 
sample that only includes participant observations unexposed to tenure length and results in 
Tables 3 and 4 consistently indicate that the presence of the independence disclosure has a 
significant positive effect on investment decisions (F:1,291 = 5.56; p = 0.02) compared to when 
the disclosure is absent (mean = 5.230 vs. 4.599). Thus, H1a is confirmed – the presence of an 
auditor independence disclosure in the audit report results in higher investment versus when the 
                                                          
12
 Two separate investment dependent measures are employed in the study. The first measure “investment 
likelihood” is observed through the question “If you were approached to purchase company stock, what is the 
likelihood you would invest in a real company similar to Tracer, Corp. (Magna, Inc.)?” The second measure 
“investment allocation” is observed via the question “Assume that you are given $10,000 that you must invest. 
Considering the information contained in the respective audit reports, indicate how much of the $10,000 you would 
invest between Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc.?” 
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disclosure is absent from the report. This implies that providing information about the auditor’s 
obligation to remain independent of its client significantly influences an investor’s willingness to 
invest in an auditee. 
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TABLE 2 
Judgment and Decision-Making: Means (Standard Deviation) by Treatment 
PANEL A: CAM PRESENT 
Independence Disclosure 
Absent 
Independence Disclosure 
Present 
 
Tenure Present 
Tenure 
Absent 
Tenure Present 
Tenure 
Absent 
 
25 
Years 2 Years 
25 
Years 2 Years 
 
n = 107 n = 107 n = 51 n = 227 n = 227 n = 93 
Investment Likelihood
a
 4.850  4.820  4.539  5.040  4.960  4.898  
 
(2.558) (2.576) (2.073) (2.559) (2.554) (2.108) 
Investment Allocation
b
 5.130  4.870  -0.529
h
 5.220  4.780  -.009
h
 
 
(1.615) (1.615) (2.493) (1.414) (1.414) (1.803) 
Independence
c
 6.640  6.840  6.304  7.090  7.490  7.747  
 
(2.295) (2.291) (2.542) (2.223) (1.994) (1.985) 
Competence
d
 7.230  6.930  6.676  7.490  7.400  7.667  
 
(2.117) (2.205) (2.114) (2.018) (1.996) (1.839) 
Report Informativeness
e
 5.830  5.840  5.265  6.180  6.350  5.984  
 
(2.549) (2.548) (2.450) (2.591) (2.550) (2.957) 
Auditor Credibility
f
 6.790  6.930  6.284  7.360  7.440  7.581  
 
(2.342) (2.120) (2.239) (1.987) (1.984) (1.846) 
Audit Quality
g
 6.930  6.810  6.343  7.270  7.260  7.602  
 
(2.111) (2.168) (2.106) (2.030) (2.041) (1.916) 
         
PANEL B: CAM PRESENT 
Compliance-Oriented 
"Independence in 
Appearance" 
Concept-Oriented 
"Independence of Mind" 
 
Tenure Present 
Tenure 
Absent 
Tenure Present 
Tenure 
Absent 
 
25 
Years 2 Years 
25 
Years 2 Years 
 
n = 138 n = 138 n = 49 n = 89 n = 89 n = 44 
Investment Likelihood
a
 4.910  4.920  5.041  5.240  5.020  4.739  
 
(2.691) (2.710) (1.898) (2.340) (2.306) (2.332) 
Investment Allocation
b
 5.250  4.750  0.020  5.170  4.830  -.041
h
 
 
(1.418) (1.418) (1.831) (1.414) (1.414) (1.791) 
Independence
c
 7.050  7.580  7.714  7.160  7.360  7.784  
 
(2.239) (1.812) (1.837) (2.210) (2.253) (2.158) 
Competence
d
 7.300  7.330  7.643  7.780  7.490  7.693  
 
(7.780) (1.900) (1.717) (1.832) (2.143) (1.986) 
Report Informativeness
e
 6.350  6.470  6.235  5.920  6.170  5.705  
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(2.502) (2.561) (2.907) (2.719) (2.537) (3.020) 
Auditor Credibility
f
 7.310  7.410  7.408  7.430  7.480  7.773  
 
(1.977) (1.958) (1.716) (2.011) (2.034) (1.984) 
Audit Quality
g
 7.170  7.270  7.510  7.430  7.250  7.705  
 
(2.075) (2.049) (1.612) (1.959) (2.041) (2.221) 
         
PANEL C: CAM ABSENT 
Independence Disclosure 
Absent 
Independence Disclosure 
Present 
 
Tenure Present 
Tenure 
Absent 
Tenure Present 
Tenure 
Absent 
 
25 
Years 2 Years 
25 
Years 2 Years 
 
n = 100 n = 100 n = 55 n = 197 n = 197 n = 96 
Investment Likelihood
a
 5.370  5.010  4.655  5.130  5.050  5.552  
 
(2.465) (2.333) (2.345) (2.694) (2.584) (2.246) 
Investment Allocation
b
 5.380  4.620  -.167
h
 5.010  4.990  0.208
h
 
 
(1.851) (1.851) (2.986) (1.760) (1.760) (1.576) 
Independence
c
 6.470  6.850  7.091  7.230  7.620  7.703  
 
(2.603) (2.320) (2.216) (2.398) (2.169) (2.302) 
Competence
d
 7.210  7.620  7.100  6.920  7.610  7.578  
 
(2.337) (2.138) (2.354) (2.321) (2.120) (2.151) 
Report Informativeness
e
 5.970  6.170  4.873  5.660  5.740  5.813  
 
(2.736) (2.745) (2.913) (2.848) (2.821) (2.739) 
Auditor Credibility
f
 7.060  6.860  7.091  7.410  7.350  7.552  
 
(2.343) (2.478) (2.158) (2.305) (2.438) (2.108) 
Audit Quality
g
 6.850  6.780  6.855  7.350  7.410  7.313  
 
(2.576) (2.464) (2.231) (2.235) (2.206) (2.426) 
         
PANEL D: CAM ABSENT 
Compliance-Oriented 
"Independence in 
Appearance" 
Concept-Oriented 
"Independence of Mind" 
 
Tenure Present 
Tenure 
Absent 
Tenure Present 
Tenure 
Absent 
 
25 
Years 2 Years 
25 
Years 2 Years 
 
n = 96 n = 96 n = 48 n = 101 n = 101 n = 48 
Investment Likelihood
a
 5.280  5.080  5.656  4.990  5.010  5.448  
 
(2.872) (2.759) (2.159) (2.520) (2.419) (2.348) 
Investment Allocation
b
 5.090  4.910  0.083
h
 4.930  5.070  0.333
h
 
 
(1.737) (1.737) (1.609) (1.787) (1.787) (1.548) 
Independence
c
 7.190  7.640  8.021  7.280  7.610  7.385  
 
(2.556) (2.340) (1.949) (2.250) (2.005) (2.589) 
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Competence
d
 7.720  7.580  7.958  7.530  7.630  7.198  
 
(2.246) (2.347) (1.771) (2.037) (1.891) (2.434) 
Report Informativeness
e
 6.080  6.010  5.677  5.260  5.480  5.948  
 
(2.890) (2.755) (2.944) (2.763) (2.873) (2.542) 
Auditor Credibility
f
 7.460  7.410  7.813  7.360  7.300  7.292  
 
(2.436) (2.614) (1.782) (2.184) (2.270) (2.381) 
Audit Quality
g
 7.400  7.600  7.896  7.310  7.230  6.729  
 
(2.408) (2.324) (1.795) (2.068) (2.083) (2.825) 
         a. The dependent measure requests that participants provide the likelihood of investing in two real companies similar 
to the hypothetical companies in the experimental materials.  
b. The dependent measure requests that participants allocate an investment sum of $10,000 between the two 
hypothetical companies. 
c. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the respective auditor was 
independent in performing the audit. 
d. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the respective auditor was 
competent in performing the audit. 
e. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate how informative the audit report was in their 
investment decisions.  
f. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the auditor was a credible 
information source. 
g. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the audit was of high quality. 
h. Means and standard deviations calculated using difference score of repeated measures investment allocation. 
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TABLE 3 
Investment: Means (Standard Deviation) for H1a, H1b 
       
 
H1a: 
Independence 
Disclosure
c
 
H1b: Independence 
Definition 
Tenure 
Disclosure
c
 
Variables Absent Present Compliance Concept Absent Present 
 
n = 313 n = 613 n = 331 n = 282 n = 295 n = 631 
Investment Likelihood
a
 4.869  5.099  5.118  5.076  5.003  5.029  
 
(2.312) (2.380) (2.442) (2.309) (2.219) (2.423) 
Investment Allocation
b, f
 0.216 0.196 0.275 0.104 -0.058 0.325  
 
(3.263) (2.799) (2.777) (2.827) (2.140) (3.271) 
       
 
H1a: 
Independence 
Disclosure
d
 
H1b: Independence 
Definition
e
 CAM Disclosure
c
 
 
Absent Present Compliance Concept Absent Present 
 
n = 106 n = 189 n = 97 n = 92 n = 448 n = 478 
Investment Likelihood
a
 4.599  5.230  5.345  5.109  5.157  4.893  
 
(2.209) (2.198) (2.044) (2.354) (2.380) (2.334) 
Investment Allocation
b, f
 -0.342 0.102 0.052 0.154 0.199 0.207  
 
(2.753) (1.690) (1.716) (1.670) (3.190) (2.735) 
       a. The dependent measure requests that participants provide the likelihood of investing in two real companies 
similar to the hypothetical companies in the experimental materials.  
b. The dependent measure requests that participants allocate an investment sum of $10,000 between the two 
hypothetical companies. 
c. Means and standard deviations calculated using full sample of 926 participant observations. 
d. Means and standard deviations calculated using restricted sample (295 participant observations), where tenure is 
not disclosed to participants. 
e. Means and standard deviations calculated using the previous restricted sample, further restricted by the presence 
of the independence disclosure. 
f. Means and standard deviations calculated using difference score of repeated measures investment allocation. 
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TABLE 4 
ANOVA: Investment Decision-Making for Between-Participants Effects 
     Investment Likelihood (DV)
a
         
  df 
Mean 
Square F-stat p-value
c
 
Independence Disclosure 1 19.74 3.56 0.06 
Tenure Disclosure 1 2.51 0.45 0.50 
CAM Disclosure 1 16.79 3.03 0.08 
Independence Disclosure × Tenure Disclosure 1 16.29 2.94 0.09 
Independence Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 0.87 0.16 0.69 
Tenure Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 1.20 0.22 0.64 
Independence × Tenure × CAM 1 7.32 1.32 0.25 
Error 918 
   
     Investment Likelihood - Restricted Sample (DV)
b
         
  
    Independence Disclosure 1 26.76 5.56 0.02 
CAM Disclosure 1 10.04 2.09 0.15 
Independence Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 4.93 1.02 0.31 
Error 291 
     
 a. The dependent measure requests that participants provide the likelihood of investing in two real companies similar 
to the hypothetical companies in the experimental materials. The results of the first between-participants test are 
calculated using the experiment's full sample of 926 participant observations. 
b. The results of the second between-participants test are calculated using a restricted sample (295 participant 
observations) from the experiment, where tenure is not disclosed to participants. 
c. All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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In a separate untabulated ANOVA model, I examine the marginal means of the 
investment decision through pairwise comparisons and find no support for the predicted effect of 
H1b that a compliance-oriented “independence in appearance” definition will result in a less 
positive investment than a concept-oriented “independence of mind” definition (F:1,605 = 0.32; p 
= 0.57; mean = 5.118 vs. 5.076). This suggests that variation in the audit report’s auditor 
independence description does not lead non-professional investors to significantly alter their 
invest decision-making. Thus, I find no support for Support Theory in the experiment by failing 
to reject H1b. 
Tests of H2 
In H2, I predict that variations in tenure length will have no impact on investment 
decisions. As reported in Table 6, support from the ANOVA within-participants test leads to 
rejecting H2 on two different investment dependent variables. The first dependent measure is 
participants’ assessment of the likelihood they would invest in two real companies similar to the 
hypothetical companies presented in the experimental materials, which differed in the length of 
disclosed audit tenure. The results of the ANOVA model report a significant p-value (F:1,627 = 
3.90; p = 0.05) where cell means in Table 5 indicate longer tenure length is associated with more 
positive investment likelihood than shorter tenure length (mean: 5.090 vs. 4.970). The second 
measured investment variable is participants’ allocation of $10,000 between the two hypothetical 
companies. This allocation also demonstrates a statistically significant effect of tenure length on 
the investment decision-making process of non-professional investors (F:1,627 = 6.98; p < 0.01). 
Means reported in Table 5 indicate that long tenure has a more positive effect on investment 
allocation than short tenure (mean = 5.160 vs. 4.840). This finding is of particular importance 
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because it suggests that companies with longer tenured auditors are a more appealing investment 
(versus those with shorter tenured auditors) to non-professional investors. 
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TABLE 5 
Investment: Means (Standard Deviation) for H2, H3, H4a, H4b 
       
 
H2: Tenure 
Length
c
 
H3: Independence 
Disclosure Present
c
 
H4b: CAM 
Disclosure 
Present
c
 
Variables 
25 
years 2 years 
25 Year 
Tenure 
2 Year 
Tenure 
25 Year 
Tenure 
2 Year 
Tenure 
 
n = 631 n = 631 n = 424 n = 424 n = 334 n = 334 
Investment Likelihood
a
 5.090  4.970  5.080  5.000  4.980  4.920  
 
(2.586) (2.529) (2.620) (2.565) (2.556) (2.558) 
Investment Allocation
b
 5.160 4.840 5.120 4.880 5.190 4.810 
 
(1.635) (1.635) (1.586) (1.586) (1.479) (1.479) 
       
 
H4a: CAM 
Disclosure Present
&
 
H4a: CAM 
Disclosure Present
d
 
  
 
Ind. 
Absent 
Ind. 
Present 
Ind. 
Absent 
Ind. 
Present 
  
 
n = 158 n = 320 n = 106 n = 189 
  
Investment Likelihood
a
 4.741  4.969  4.539  4.898  
  
 
(2.327) (2.337) (2.073) (2.108) 
  
Investment Allocation
b, e
 0.004 0.307 -0.053 -0.009 
  
 
(3.026) (2.578) (2.493) (1.803) 
  
   
  
  a. The dependent measure requests that participants provide the likelihood of investing in two real companies 
similar to the hypothetical companies in the experimental materials.  
b. The dependent measure requests that participants allocate an investment sum of $10,000 between the two 
hypothetical companies. 
c. Means and standard deviations calculated using repeated measures investment allocation. 
d. Means and standard deviations calculated using restricted sample (295 participant observations), where tenure is 
not disclosed to participants. 
e. Means calculated using difference score of repeated measures investment allocation. 
        
 
  
47 
 
TABLE 6 
ANOVA: Investment Decision-Making for Within-Participants Treatment 
Effects 
     Investment Likelihood (DV)
a
         
  df 
Mean 
Square F-stat p-value
c
 
Tenure Length 1 5.23 3.90    0.05 
Tenure Length × Independence Disclosure 1 0.89 0.66    0.42 
Tenure Length × CAM Disclosure 1 2.04 1.52    0.22 
Tenure Length × Independence × CAM 1 1.78 1.33    0.25 
Error 627 
   
     Investment Allocation (DV)
b
         
  
    Tenure Length 1 37.32 6.98 < 0.01 
Tenure Length × Independence Disclosure 1 5.71 1.07    0.30 
Tenure Length × CAM Disclosure 1 0.12 0.02    0.89 
Tenure Length × Independence × CAM 1 15.00 2.81    0.09 
Error 627 
       
 a. The first repeated dependent measure requests that participants provide the likelihood of investing in two real 
companies similar to the hypothetical companies in the experimental materials 
b. The second repeated measure dependent variable instructs participants to allocate $10,000 between the two 
hypothetical companies. 
c. All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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Tests of H3, H4a, and H4b 
I also predict interactions among the proposed disclosures. In H3, I predict that the 
independence disclosure will result in a more positive effect on investment by non-professional 
investors when disclosed tenure is long compared to when it is short. Results in Tables 5 and 6 
provide no evidence of a significant interaction on either the investment likelihood dependent 
measure (F:1,627 = 0.66; p = 0.42) or the investment allocation dependent measure (F:1,627 = 1.07; 
p = 0.30) when tenure length and independence are disclosed together (mean = 5.080 vs 5.000 
(investment likelihood); 5.120 vs. 4.880 (investment allocation)). Thus, H3 is not supported. This 
finding is interesting because it implies that describing auditor independence alongside lengthy 
auditor tenure (presumably an indicator of both independence and competence) does not induce a 
significant difference in investing behavior compared to when short tenure accompanies the 
independence disclosure (presumably a redundant indicator of independence).  
In H4a, I predict the interaction between the independence disclosure and the presence of 
a CAM disclosure will result in less positive investment by non-professional investors than when 
the audit report does not disclose an independence statement. As noted in Tables 4 and 5, I do 
not find support that disclosing an independence statement in concert with a CAM in the audit 
report negatively impacts likelihood of investment significantly more than when an 
independence statement is absent in either the full (F:1,918 = 0.16; p = 0.69; mean = 4.969 vs. 
4.741) or the restricted sample (F:1,291 = 1.02; p = 0.31; mean = 4.898 vs 4.539). In H4b, I 
predict the CAM disclosure will result in more positive investment by non-professional investors 
when tenure is long compared to when it is short. As presented in Tables 5 and 6, the results for 
both the investment likelihood measure (F:1,627 = 1.52; p = 0.22; mean = 4.980 vs. 4.920) as well 
as the investment allocation measure (F:1,627 = 0.02; p = 0.89; mean = 5.190 vs. 4.810) indicate 
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no support for the notion that a critical audit matter disclosure accompanied by disclosure of long 
tenure results in a more positive investment compared to when tenure is short, which infers that 
coupling negative information from a CAM with disclosures about an auditor’s independence 
and competence has no significant impact on related investment decisions.  
Non-professional Investor Judgments on Auditor Characteristics, Auditor Credibility, and 
Audit Quality 
 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 present the ANOVA models and cell means of the participants’ 
judgments on auditor independence, auditor competence, audit report informativeness, auditor 
credibility, and audit quality. The means suggest that the presence of an independence disclosure 
in the audit report has a statistically significant impact on participant judgments of auditor 
characteristics regarding auditor independence (F:1,918 = 28.79; p < 0.01) and auditor competence 
(F:1,918 = 15.68; p < 0.01), where the presence of the independence (versus absence) disclosures 
results in more positive assessments of both auditor independence (mean = 7.470 vs. 6.706) and 
auditor competence (mean = 7.554 vs. 7.013). 
Disclosure of tenure length also influences judgments about auditor independence (F:1,627 
= 19.95; p < 0.01) and auditor competence (F:1,627 = 8.56; p < 0.01), where short tenure 
(compared to long tenure) results in more positive assessment of auditor independence (mean = 
7.320 vs. 6.960) while long tenure (compared to short tenure) results in more positive assessment 
of auditor competence (mean = 7.440 vs. 7.310). Further, a significant interaction (F:1, 627 = 4.13; 
p = 0.04) exists between the presence of the independence disclosure and tenure length on 
auditor competence such that the presence of the independence disclosure increases perceptions 
of auditor competence more for short tenure (mean = 7.500 (present) vs 6.920 (absent)) than for 
long tenure (mean = 7.550 (present) and 7.220 (absent)). 
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TABLE 7 
Auditor and Audit Judgments:  Means (Standard Deviation)  
     
 
Independence Disclosure Tenure Length
f
 
Variables Absent Present 25 years 2 years 
 
n = 313 n = 613 n = 631 n = 631 
Independence
a
 6.706 7.470 6.960 7.320 
 
(2.261) (2.052) (2.366) (2.176) 
Competence
b
 7.013 7.554 7.440 7.310 
 
(2.152) (1.961) (2.127) (2.138) 
Report Informativeness
c
 5.649 5.970 5.930 6.040 
 
(2.655) (2.686) (2.693) (2.676) 
Auditor Credibility
d
 6.840 7.443 7.230 7.230 
 
(2.208) (2.028) (2.215) (2.260) 
Audit Quality
e
 6.765 7.361 7.170 7.160 
 
(2.193) (2.061) (2.205) (2.196) 
     
 
Independence Disclosure 
Present
f
 
Independence Disclosure 
Absent
f
 
 
25 Year 
Tenure 
2 Year 
Tenure 
25 Year 
Tenure 
2 Year  
Tenure    
 
n = 424 n = 424 n = 207 n = 207 
Independence
a
 7.160 7.550 6.560 6.850 
 
(2.304) (2.076) (2.445) (2.299) 
Competence
b
 7.550 7.500 7.220 6.920 
 
(2.074) (2.055) (2.221) (2.256) 
Report Informativeness
c
 5.940 6.070 5.900 6.000 
 
(2.723) (2.694) (2.636) (2.644) 
Auditor Credibility
d
 7.380 7.400 6.920 6.900 
 
(2.138) (2.204) (2.341) (2.339) 
Audit Quality
e
 7.310 7.330 6.890 6.800 
 
(2.125) (2.118) (2.342) (2.310) 
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CAM Disclosure Present
f
 CAM Disclosure Present 
 
25 Year 
Tenure 
2 Year  
Tenure 
Independence 
Absent 
Independence 
Present 
 
n = 334 n = 334 n = 158 n = 320 
Independence
a
 6.950  7.280  6.601  7.425  
 
(2.253) (2.112) (2.264) (1.917) 
Competence
b
 7.410  7.250  6.949  7.508  
 
(2.051) (2.074) (2.054) (1.873) 
Report Informativeness
c
 6.070  6.190  5.652  6.184  
 
(2.579) (2.557) (2.494) (2.642) 
Auditor Credibility
d
 7.180  7.280  6.703  7.364  
 
(2.120) (2.070) (2.055) (1.916) 
Audit Quality
e
 7.160  7.120  6.677  7.450  
 
(2.059) (2.090) (2.203) (1.841) 
          
a. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the respective auditor was 
independent in performing the audit. 
b. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the respective auditor was 
competent in performing the audit. 
c. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate how informative the audit report was in their 
investment decisions.  
d. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the auditor was a credible 
information source. 
e. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the audit was of high quality. 
f. Means and standard deviations calculated using repeated measures on all dependent variables. 
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TABLE 8 
ANOVA: Judgments of Auditor Independence, Auditor Competence, and 
Audit Report Informativeness 
     Panel A:  Auditor Independence (DV)
a, b
         
Between-Participants  df 
Mean 
Square F-stat p-value
e
 
Independence Disclosure 1 129.72 28.79 < 0.01 
Tenure Disclosure 1 5.91 1.31    0.25 
CAM Disclosure 1 7.21 1.60    0.21 
Independence Disclosure × Tenure Disclosure 1 6.18 1.37    0.24 
Independence Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 4.27 0.95    0.33 
Tenure Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 5.42 1.20    0.27 
Independence × Tenure × CAM 1 12.56 2.79    0.10 
Error 918 
   
     Within-Participants 
    Tenure Length 1 32.46 19.95 < 0.01 
Tenure Length × Independence Disclosure 1 0.81 0.50    0.48 
Tenure Length × CAM Disclosure 1 0.52 0.32    0.57 
Tenure Length × Independence × CAM 1 0.65 0.40    0.53 
Error 627 
   
     Panel B:  Auditor Competence (DV)
a, c
         
Between-Participants  df 
Mean 
Square F-stat p-value
e
 
Independence Disclosure 1 64.71 15.68 < 0.01 
Tenure Disclosure 1 0.38 0.09    0.76 
CAM Disclosure 1 2.79 0.68    0.41 
Independence Disclosure × Tenure Disclosure 1 3.49 0.85    0.36 
Independence Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 1.19 0.29    0.59 
Tenure Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 0.35 0.09    0.77 
Independence × Tenure × CAM 1 5.59 1.36    0.25 
Error 918 
   
     Within-Participants 
    Tenure Length 1 8.65 8.56 < 0.01 
Tenure Length × Independence Disclosure 1 4.18 4.13    0.04 
Tenure Length × CAM Disclosure 1 0.16 0.16    0.69 
Tenure Length × Independence × CAM 1 0.06 0.06    0.81 
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Error 627 
   
     Panel C:  Audit Report Informativeness (DV)
a, d
         
Between-Participants  df 
Mean 
Square F-stat p-value
e
 
Independence Disclosure 1 33.58 4.73    0.03 
Tenure Disclosure 1 42.75 6.02    0.01 
CAM Disclosure 1 9.19 1.30    0.26 
Independence Disclosure × Tenure Disclosure 1 29.19 4.11    0.04 
Independence Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 3.85 0.54    0.46 
Tenure Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 0.59 0.08    0.77 
Independence × Tenure × CAM 1 11.92 1.68    0.20 
Error 918 
   
     Within-Participants 
    Tenure Length 1 3.63 4.38    0.04 
Tenure Length × Independence Disclosure 1 0.03 0.03    0.86 
Tenure Length × CAM Disclosure 1 0.16 0.19    0.66 
Tenure Length × Independence × CAM 1 1.42 1.72    0.19 
Error 627 
             
a. Measured variables of non-professional investor judgment. 
b. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the respective auditor was 
independent in performing the audit. 
c. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the respective auditor was 
competent in performing the audit. 
d. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate how informative the audit report was in their 
investment decisions.  
e. Reported p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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TABLE 9 
ANOVA: Judgments of Auditor Credibility and Audit Quality 
     Panel A:  Auditor Credibility (DV)
a, b
         
Between-Participants  df 
Mean 
Square F-stat p-value
d
 
Independence Disclosure 1 83.52 19.11 < 0.01 
Tenure Disclosure 1 0.10 0.02    0.88 
CAM Disclosure 1 8.33 1.91    0.17 
Independence Disclosure × Tenure Disclosure 1 7.43 1.70    0.19 
Independence Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 10.26 2.35    0.13 
Tenure Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 5.60 1.28    0.26 
Independence × Tenure × CAM 1 5.93 1.36    0.25 
Error 918 
   
     Within-Participants 
    Tenure Length 1 0.02 0.02    0.89 
Tenure Length × Independence Disclosure 1 0.12 0.11    0.74 
Tenure Length × CAM Disclosure 1 3.92 3.56    0.06 
Tenure Length × Independence × CAM 1 0.73 0.66    0.42 
Error 627 
   
     Panel B:  Audit Quality (DV)
a, c
         
Between-Participants  df 
Mean 
Square F-stat p-value
d
 
Independence Disclosure 1 81.53 18.34 < 0.01 
Tenure Disclosure 1 0.57 0.13    0.72 
CAM Disclosure 1 0.88 0.20    0.66 
Independence Disclosure × Tenure Disclosure 1 6.56 1.48    0.23 
Independence Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 4.49 1.01    0.32 
Tenure Disclosure × CAM Disclosure 1 0.32 0.07    0.79 
Independence × Tenure × CAM 1 10.81 2.43    0.12 
Error 918 
   
     Within-Participants 
    Tenure Length 1 0.36 0.35    0.56 
Tenure Length × Independence Disclosure 1 0.99 0.96    0.33 
Tenure Length × CAM Disclosure 1 0.27 0.27    0.61 
Tenure Length × Independence × CAM 1 0.01 0.01    0.93 
Error 627 1.10 
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a. Measured variables of non-professional investor judgment. 
b. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the auditor was a credible 
information source. 
c. The dependent measure requests that the participants indicate their confidence that the audit was of high quality. 
d. Reported p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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Judgments of the informativeness of the audit report are also statistically significant when 
both independence (F:1,918 = 4.73; p = 0.03) and auditor tenure (F:1,918 = 6.02; p < 0.01) are 
disclosed in the audit report. Specifically, higher judgments of informativeness are elicited when 
independence is disclosed versus absent (mean = 5.970 vs. 5.649) as well as when tenure is 
disclosed versus absent (mean = 5.985 vs. 5.597, untabulated). In addition, statistically 
significant interactions between disclosure of independence and auditor tenure (F:1,918 = 4.11; p 
= 0.04) as well as disclosure of independence and length of tenure (F:1,627 = 4.38; p = 0.04) exist 
for audit report informativeness, where the presence of both disclosures elicit higher assessment 
of informativeness versus when either (or both) are absent from the audit report as well as a 
higher assessment of informativeness when tenure is short and independence is present. 
Finally, investor judgments of auditor credibility (F:1,918 = 19.11; p < 0.01) and audit 
quality (F:1,918 = 18.34; p < 0.01) are higher when the independence disclosure is present in the 
audit report (as evidenced in Table 9). Comparison of means in Table 7 suggests that the 
presence of the independence disclosure produces more positive judgments of both auditor 
credibility (mean = 7.443 vs. 6.840) and audit quality (mean = 7.361 vs. 6.765) than when the 
disclosure is absent. Also of note, a marginally significant interaction (F:1,627 = 3.56; p = 0.06) 
exists between tenure length and the presence of a CAM on auditor credibility, where a reversal 
in the means is noted for long tenure (short tenure) and no disclosure of a CAM (mean = 7.29 vs 
7.19, untabulated) and long tenure (short tenure) and disclosure of a CAM (mean = 7.18 vs 7.28). 
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Moderated-Mediation Analysis 
In the hypothesis development section of the paper, I suggest that the presence of auditor 
independence and tenure disclosures will augment participant judgments about auditor attributes 
of independence and competence as well as the auditor’s credibility and the audit’s quality – 
increasing the overall informativeness of the report and thus influencing consequent investment 
decisions. Results confirm that the presence of an independence disclosure in the audit report 
produces more positive judgments of auditor independence, auditor competence, audit quality, 
and auditor credibility. Evidence also indicates that exposure to long tenure results in higher 
judgments of auditor competence while short tenure results in higher judgments of auditor 
independence. I further test the effects auditor independence and auditor competence have on 
investment decisions as mediated by measurements of auditor credibility and audit quality. I 
perform the analysis using a moderated-mediation model (Hayes 2013). Figures 2 and 3 present 
the results of the moderated-mediation analysis (and correspond to Tables 10 and 11, 
respectively). 
In the auditor credibility regression model, I find that judgments of both auditor 
independence (path a1: t = 4.842; p < 0.01) and competence (path a2: t = 12.064; p < 0.01) have a 
significantly positive influence on judgment of auditor credibility. However, I do not find that 
the effects of either measured auditor attribute in relationship to auditor credibility depend upon 
one another. In other words, judgments of both attributes independently influence judgments of 
auditor credibility. Most important, evidence suggests that judgments of the auditor attribute 
independence (path c1: t = 2.252; p = 0.03) and judgments of auditor credibility (path b: t = 
5.893; p < 0.01) significantly influence investment decision-making. Additionally, the 
relationship between auditor credibility and investment decision-making is positive (path b = 
0.350) – indicating that higher perceptions of auditor credibility spur more positive investment. 
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TABLE 10 
Moderated-Mediation: Judgments of Auditor Independence, Auditor 
Competence, and Auditor Credibility 
      Panel A:  Regression Model of Auditor Credibility 
 
  Coefficient SE t-stat p-value
c
 
Independence
a
 a1 0.240 0.050 4.842 < 0.01 
Competence
a
 a2 0.597 0.050 12.064 < 0.01 
Independence × Competence
a
 a3 0.003 0.006 0.527    0.59 
Independence Disclosure
b
 covariate 0.067 0.085 0.792    0.43 
Tenure Disclosure
b
 covariate 0.025 0.805 0.293    0.77 
CAM Disclosure
b
 covariate 0.002 0.079 0.026    0.98 
      Panel B:  Regression Model of Investment Decision 
 
  Coefficient SE t-stat p-value
c
 
Auditor Credibility
a
 b 0.350 0.059 5.893 < 0.01 
Independence
a
 c1 0.204 0.090 2.252    0.03 
Competence
a
 c2 0.039 0.096 0.402    0.69 
Independence × Competence
a
 c3 -0.008 0.011 -0.733    0.46 
Independence Disclosure
b
 covariate -0.085 0.152 -0.557    0.58 
Tenure Disclosure
b
 covariate 0.071 0.153 0.467    0.64 
CAM Disclosure
b
 covariate -0.225 0.142 -1.579    0.11 
      Panel C:  Conditional Direct Effects of Independence on Investment at Competence Value 
 
Competence Effect SE t-stat p-value
c
 
 
5.328 0.160 0.056 2.866 < 0.01 
 
7.371 0.143 0.055 2.588 < 0.01 
 
9.414 0.126 0.064 1.985    0.05 
      Panel D:  Conditional Indirect Effects of Independence on Investment at Competence Value
d
 
 
Competence Effect SE LLCI ULCI 
 
5.328 0.090 0.023 0.0523 0.1418 
 
7.371 0.093 0.093 0.0544 0.1442 
 
9.414 0.095 0.095 0.0548 0.1510 
 
    
 a. Measured variables of non-professional investor judgment. 
b. Manipulated variables, independence disclosure, tenure disclosure, and CAM disclosure, are covaried in the 
model. 
c. Reported p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
d. Panel D report the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples. 
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a1 = .240 b = .350
p < .01 p < .01
c1' = .204
p = .03
c2' = .039
a2 = .597 p = .69
p < .01
c3' = -.008
p = .46
a3 = .003
p = .60
a. Manipulated variables independence disclosure, tenure disclosure, and CAM disclosure are covaried in the model.
Figure 2
INDEPENDENCE 
X COMPETENCE
Statistical Diagram of Auditor Characteristics and Auditor Credibility Moderated-
Mediation Analysis
a
AUDITOR 
CREDIBILITY
INDEPENDENCE
INVESTMENT 
DECISION
COMPETENCE
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Probing further, I explore the conditional direct effects of judged independence and 
judged competence on investment decision-making. Results suggest that the direct effect of 
perceived independence on investment decision does not depend upon the participant’s 
perception of competence; however, the effect of independence is significant and positive at all 
values of competence beginning with a judged competence value of 5.328 (t = 2.866; p < 0.01). I 
also examine the conditional indirect effect of auditor independence and note that the effect is 
significant and positive at all values of auditor competence through the audit credibility 
mediator. 
Regarding the audit quality regression model, I note that judgments of both auditor 
independence (path a1: t = 5.423; p < 0.01) and competence (path a2 t = 12.459; p < 0.01) have a 
significantly positive influence on judgment of auditor quality. However, similar to perceived 
auditor credibility, I do not find that judgments of either measured auditor attribute in 
relationship to audit quality are dependent upon one another (path a3 t = -0.070; p = 0.94). In 
addition, results suggest that judgments of the auditor independence attribute (path c1 t = 2.317;  
p = 0.02 and audit quality (path b t = 4.734;  p < 0.01) significantly influence investment 
decision-making. Testing the conditional direct effects, evidence indicates that the direct effect 
of judged independence on investment decision-making is significant and positive as the value of 
competence increases – illustrating significance (t = 3.101; p < 0.01) beginning with a judged 
competence value of 5.328. Further, I also examine the conditional indirect effect of auditor 
independence and note that the effect is significant and positive at higher values of auditor 
competence through the audit quality mediator. 
  
61 
 
TABLE 11 
Moderated-Mediation: Judgments of Auditor Independence, Auditor 
Competence, and Audit Quality 
      Panel A:  Regression Model of Audit Quality 
 
  Coefficient SE t-stat p-value
c
 
Independence
a
 a1 0.271 0.050 5.423 < 0.01 
Competence
a
 a2 0.621 0.050 12.459 < 0.01 
Independence × Competence
a
 a3 -0.0004 0.006 -0.070    0.94 
Independence Disclosure
b
 covariate 0.054 0.085 0.634    0.53 
Tenure Disclosure
b
 covariate 0.058 0.086 0.682    0.50 
CAM Disclosure
b
 covariate 0.061 0.080 0.759    0.45 
      Panel B:  Regression Model of Investment Decision 
 
  Coefficient SE t-stat p-value
c
 
Audit Quality
a
 b 0.281 0.059 4.734 < 0.01 
Independence
a
 c1 0.212 0.091 2.317    0.02 
Competence
a
 c2 0.073 0.097 0.753    0.45 
Independence × Competence
a
 c3 -0.007 0.011 -0.615    0.54 
Independence Disclosure
b
 covariate -0.076 0.153 -0.500    0.62 
Tenure Disclosure
b
 covariate 0.064 0.154 0.414    0.68 
CAM Disclosure
b
 covariate -0.241 0.143 -1.682    0.09 
      Panel C:  Conditional Direct Effects of Independence on Investment at Competence Value 
 
Competence Effect SE t-stat p-value
c
 
 
5.328 0.175 0.056 3.101 < 0.01 
 
7.371 0.161 0.056 2.880 < 0.01 
 
9.414 0.146 0.064 2.286    0.02 
      Panel D:  Conditional Indirect Effects of Independence on Investment at Competence Value
d
 
 
Competence Effect SE LLCI ULCI 
 
5.328 0.076 0.020 0.0418 0.1222 
 
7.371 0.075 0.020 0.0421 0.1257 
 
9.414 0.075 0.021 0.0412 0.1250 
            
a. Measured variables of non-professional investor judgment. 
b. Manipulated variables, independence disclosure, tenure disclosure, and CAM disclosure, are covaried in the 
model. 
c. Reported p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
d. Panel D report the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrap samples. 
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a1 = .271 b = .281
p < .01 p < .01
c1' = .212
p = .02
c2' = .073
a2 = .621 p = .45
p < .01
c3' = -.007
p = .54
a3 = -.0004
p = .95
Figure 3
a. Manipulated variables independence disclosure, tenure disclosure, and CAM disclosure are covaried in the model.
COMPETENCE
INDEPENDENCE 
X COMPETENCE
Statistical Diagram of Auditor Characteristics and Audit Quality Moderated-Mediation 
Analysis
a
AUDIT QUALITY
INDEPENDENCE
INVESTMENT 
DECISION
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V. CONCLUSION 
The reform instituted in the PCAOB’s proposed ARM standard intends to make the audit 
report more value relevant in the investment decisions of financial statement users. The regulator 
asserts that including new information in the audit report regarding the auditor will accomplish 
this feat. Prior psychology and accounting literature illustrates that revealing characteristics 
about an information source’s independence and competence influences the perception of the 
information source as well as the persuasiveness of its communication. However, the impact the 
PCAOB’s proposed disclosures will have on the perception of auditors and how those 
perceptions relate to investment decisions is currently unsubstantiated. Therefore, I employ a 
strict yet contextually rich experiment to investigate whether exposure to the proposed 
disclosures about the auditor alter non-professional investor judgment and decision-making. 
Specifically, I test whether the disclosures regarding the auditor’s obligation to remain 
independent of its client and the length of an auditor tenure affect judgments of auditor 
independence, auditor competence, auditor credibility, audit quality, and consequent investment 
in an auditee. 
Altogether, my analysis suggests that reforming the audit report to include the new 
disclosures do in fact make it more informative and useful to report readers in both their 
judgments on auditors and their decisions to invest. Accordingly, the overarching contribution of 
this study is informing the PCAOB that moving beyond the audit report’s current pass/fail model 
by adding supplemental information regarding the auditor appears beneficial to audit report 
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readers – specifically non-professional investors. Another major contribution of this study is that 
these judgments and decisions stem exclusively from exposure to the audit report, with very little 
accompanying financial statement information.  
Another important contribution of this experiment is that it specifically tests assertions 
made by constituents of the PCAOB and not just those of the regulator. Investors providing 
feedback to the PCAOB advocate that including both a strong statement explaining auditor 
independence in the audit report and disclosing “key engagement statistics” about the audit 
function (specifically auditor tenure) will be useful to their investment decision-making process 
(PCAOB 2011; PCAOB 2013). While the Big Four and the CAQ recognize that these proposed 
disclosures will characterize the auditor and the financial statement, they only acknowledge that 
the tenure disclosure may give a false impression about the financial statement auditor to report 
readers. The organizations suggest the disclosure will give “undue prominence” to lengthy audit 
tenure regarding its relationship with perceived auditor independence and audit quality, where 
they infer that long tenure will negatively influence both (Deloitte 2013; KPMG 2013; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013).  
Testing those specific constituent statements, evidence from my study suggests that the 
PCAOB’s proposed disclosures on auditor independence and auditor tenure do appear to alter 
non-professional investor judgments of auditor attributes, the informativeness of the audit report, 
and related investment decisions of non-professional investors. While my results confirm 
practitioner concern that lengthy auditor tenure diminishes perceived auditor independence, 
evidence also provides that lengthy auditor tenure augments perceived auditor competence. Most 
important, my findings advise that the disclosure of lengthy auditor tenure in the audit report 
results in more positive investment compared to when auditor tenure is short – despite a 
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reduction in perceived auditor independence. Thus, although participants are sensitive to 
protracted tenure regarding auditor independence, it appears their sensitivity to the impact 
lengthy tenure has on auditor competence is the catalyst driving their investment decisions. 
Additionally, the results of this study provide evidence that non-professional investors are not 
any more likely to alter their investment decisions when exposed to a disclosure identifying a 
critical audit matter in the audit report and a simultaneous independence disclosure or auditor 
tenure disclosure.  
My results also contribute to the credibility and audit quality literature. I extend the 
theory that revealing information regarding the auditor’s obligation to remain independent of its 
client results in altering judgments of the auditor’s credibility. Evidence also confirms that 
disclosing an independence statement in the audit report augments perceived auditor quality. 
This study also provides confirmation that separate conditional indirect paths on investment 
decisions exist for judgments of auditor independence and auditor competence as mediated by 
judgments on auditor credibility, where auditor credibility directly impacts investment decision-
making. Further, a direct path exists for judgments on auditor independence influencing 
investment decisions. I also find similar conditional indirect paths for the judgments of auditor 
independence and auditor competence through the audit quality mediator, where a direct path 
exists for judged audit quality on investment decision-making. These findings suggest that, to the 
extent regulators can improve the perception of auditor independence and auditor competence 
through disclosures in the audit report, the consequences are higher assessments of auditor 
credibility and audit quality as well as increased usefulness of the audit report to investment 
decision-making. 
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Another unique contribution of this study submits that obtaining access to information 
regarding the auditor’s obligation to remain independent as well as the length of time the auditor 
has served its client is informative and useful for non-professional investors. This is particularly 
important because, while institutional investors presumably have access to many auditor data 
points not available to the general public, this information may be cost-prohibitive for non-
professional investors to obtain. I provide evidence that the proposed auditor information is 
meaningful to these types of investors; thus, to the extent similar disclosures are relatively 
costless to provide, regulators should consider disclosing additional information regarding the 
auditor and the audit process.  
Inferences made from my study should consider the inherent limitations of the 
experimental design. First, the manipulations represented inside the audit report were 
emphasized to the report reader. In a real-world setting, this information would not be 
emphasized. Therefore, it is possible that the participants attended to information about the 
auditor in this study in a different manner than they would in a real-world scenario. Also, in a 
non-experimental setting, the investment decisions of non-professional investors would most 
likely include analyzing complete sets of financial statement information alongside the 
accompanying audit report, whereas my study did not include such financial statement 
information.  
Concerning ideas for additional research, the literature would benefit from experimental 
studies which test the impact all of the PCAOB’s proposed alterations to the audit report may 
have on investment decisions. For example, the PCAOB also endeavors to reveal the amount and 
substance of audit work completed by joint auditors. Further, the PCAOB proposes including 
auditor judgments in the audit report regarding their work around other information in the 
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financial statements. Also of interest, the disclosures proposed by current PCAOB promulgation 
will move the audit report from a standard one page report to a document with a considerable 
amount of additional content. Research surrounding potential unintended consequences of this 
particular change to the structure of the audit report is equally important as studying how each of 
the proposed components will work separately to influence investment decisions. Last, those 
engaged in archival accounting research should consider testing audit report modification after 
the regulation is finalized.  
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APPENDIX 
[CONSENT AND EXPERIMENTAL TASK EXPLANATION IN AMAZON MECHANICAL 
TURK] 
 
Explanation of Participant Task 
 
Thank you for participating in this task. Your task in this experiment is to make judgments and 
decisions related to the financial statement audits of two companies based on some general 
information about the companies as well as their respective auditor's reports. There are no 
right/wrong or correct/incorrect answers. Use your own judgment to answer the task questions 
honestly so that I may understand how investors interpret the auditor's report. Although actual 
investment decisions may be more complex, please base your judgments in this study solely on 
the information provided. Most participants complete the task in less than 15 minutes.  
 
Your participation is completely voluntary and there are no foreseeable risks or discomforts if 
you choose to participate in this study. Your responses are anonymous and will be held on a 
password-protected computer. The results of this study may be published or presented at 
professional meetings; however, the findings will be summarized and reported in group form 
(i.e., not on an individual basis).  
  
You will be screened before beginning the task based on responses to some basic questions. If 
your answers indicate that you do not meet our required characteristics you will be redirected to 
Amazon Mechanical Turk's website and will not be paid. You must answer all questions 
completely in order to be paid for your participation. You will be paid $1.00 for completing the 
task. 
  
Again, thank you for your participation in this experiment. 
  
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s IRB. The IRB determined that 
this study fulfills the human research subject protections obligations required by state and federal 
law and University policies. If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding your rights 
as a participant of research, please contact The University of Mississippi’s IRB at (662) 915-
7482. 
 
[PAGE BREAK] 
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 [EXPERIMENTAL SCREEN QUESTIONS IN AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK] 
   
1. Do you have experience reading financial statements? 
___ Yes   
___ No    
   
2. Please indicate how many college level courses you have completed in each of the following 
disciplines:   
___ Accounting   
___ Business Administration   
___ Economics   
___ Finance   
___ Management   
 
[REDIRECTED FROM AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK TO QUALTRICS] 
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[COMPANY BACKGROUND INFORMATION] 
 
Information about two hypothetical companies - Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. 
 
Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. are both large technology companies engaged in selling electronic 
equipment to industrial consumers. Both companies are publicly traded on a major U.S. stock 
exchange. Also, both are audited by large international public accounting firms. Tracer, Corp. is 
audited by ABC Firm while Magna, Inc. is audited by XYZ Firm. Regarding financial 
performance strength, both perform similar to their peers in the technology industry. 
 
Upon reviewing both Tracer, Corp.’s and Magna, Inc.'s financial statements as well as their 
management disclosures, you made note of the following three items from both sets of financial 
statements. A financial statement auditor would also be sensitive to these items. 
1. Bad debt: Both companies are experiencing a slight slow-down in collections versus the 
prior year due to a customer filing for bankruptcy. This could impact the ability of the 
companies to collect receivables in the future, thus negatively impacting the value of the 
related receivables. 
2. Revenue recognition: Revenue recognition is highly subjective in the technology 
industry due to issues surrounding product deliverable arrangements that may extend 
over a long period of time. In addition, the value assigned to various elements in an 
arrangement may depend on management's judgment, which can be highly subjective and 
not easily verifiable. 
3. Inventory valuation: Both companies may experience obsolescence in inventory and a 
subsequent impairment of the asset account because they may have overestimated their 
ability to effectively market a new product due to both customer acceptance issues and 
the availability of substitutes in the market. As a result, both companies may have 
overproduced the product.  
 [PAGE BREAK] 
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[*REPORT WITH COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED INDEPENDENCE, ALTERNATE TENURE, 
AND CAM CONDITION*] 
 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Tracer, Corp. in accordance 
with the United States federal securities 
laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"). We or our 
predecessor firms have served as Tracer 
Corp.'s auditor consecutively since 2013. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Magna, Inc. in accordance 
with the United States federal securities 
laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"). We or our 
predecessor firms have served as Magna, 
Inc.’s auditor consecutively since 1990. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
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management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining sufficient 
appropriate evidence; or (3) posed the most 
difficulty to us in forming our opinion on the 
financial statements. The critical audit matters 
communicated below do not alter in any way 
our opinion on the financial statements, taken 
as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of the Tracer Corp.’s 
inventory value was a critical audit matter 
in the audit of Tracer Corp.’s financial 
statement as of and for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2014. Considerations 
that led to our determination included the 
following: Tracer Corp. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of Magna Inc.’s inventory 
value was a critical audit matter in the 
audit of Magna Inc.’s financial statement 
as of and for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2014. Considerations that led 
to our determination included the 
following: Magna, Inc. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
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considerations, our assessment of Tracer 
Corp.'s evaluation of the inventory value: 
(1) involved subjective auditor judgments 
in evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
considerations, our assessment of Magna, 
Inc.’s evaluation of the inventory value: (1) 
involved subjective auditor judgments in 
evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
 
[*REPORT WITH COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED INDEPENDENCE, ALTERNATE TENURE, 
AND NO CAM CONDITION*] 
 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Tracer, Corp. in 
accordance with the United States federal 
securities laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Magna, Inc. in accordance 
with the United States federal securities 
laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission ("SEC"). We or our 
predecessor firms have served as Tracer 
Corp.'s auditor consecutively since 2013. 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
Commission ("SEC"). We or our 
predecessor firms have served as Magna, 
Inc.’s auditor consecutively since 1990. 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
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financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
 
[*REPORT WITH COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED INDEPENDENCE, NO TENURE, AND CAM 
CONDITION*] 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Tracer, Corp. in 
accordance with the United States federal 
securities laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"). 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Magna, Inc. in accordance 
with the United States federal securities 
laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"). 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
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statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of the Tracer Corp.’s 
inventory value was a critical audit matter 
in the audit of Tracer Corp.’s financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of Magna Inc.’s inventory 
value was a critical audit matter in the 
audit of Magna Inc.’s financial statement 
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statement as of and for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2014. Considerations 
that led to our determination included the 
following: Tracer Corp. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Tracer 
Corp.'s evaluation of the inventory value: 
(1) involved subjective auditor judgments 
in evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
as of and for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2014. Considerations that led 
to our determination included the 
following: Magna, Inc. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Magna, 
Inc.’s evaluation of the inventory value: (1) 
involved subjective auditor judgments in 
evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
 
[*REPORT WITH COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED INDEPENDENCE, NO TENURE, AND NO 
CAM CONDITION*]  
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
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We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Tracer, Corp. in 
accordance with the United States federal 
securities laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"). 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Magna, Inc. in accordance 
with the United States federal securities 
laws and the applicable rules and 
regulations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC"). 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
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subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
 
[*REPORT WITH CONCEPT-ORIENTED INDEPENDENCE, ALTERNATE TENURE, AND 
CAM CONDITION*] 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Tracer, Corp. in 
performing an audit without being affected 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Magna, Inc. in performing 
an audit without being affected by 
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by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act 
with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. We or our 
predecessor firms have served as Tracer 
Corp.'s auditor consecutively since 2013. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act 
with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. We or our 
predecessor firms have served as Magna, 
Inc.’s auditor consecutively since 1990. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
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the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of the Tracer Corp.’s 
inventory value was a critical audit matter 
in the audit of Tracer Corp.’s financial 
statement as of and for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2014. Considerations 
that led to our determination included the 
following: Tracer Corp. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Tracer 
Corp.'s evaluation of the inventory value: 
(1) involved subjective auditor judgments 
in evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of Magna Inc.’s inventory 
value was a critical audit matter in the 
audit of Magna Inc.’s financial statement 
as of and for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2014. Considerations that led 
to our determination included the 
following: Magna, Inc. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Magna, 
Inc.’s evaluation of the inventory value: (1) 
involved subjective auditor judgments in 
evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
 
[*REPORT WITH CONCEPT ORIENTED INDEPENDENCE, ALTERNATE TENURE, AND NO 
CAM CONDITION*] 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
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Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Tracer, Corp. in 
performing an audit without being affected 
by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act 
with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. We or our 
predecessor firms have served as Tracer 
Corp.'s auditor consecutively since 2013. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Magna, Inc. in performing 
an audit without being affected by 
influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act 
with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. We or our 
predecessor firms have served as Magna, 
Inc.’s auditor consecutively since 1990. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
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year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
 
[*REPORT WITH CONCEPT -ORIENTED INDEPENDENCE, NO TENURE, AND CAM 
CONDITION*] 
 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
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of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Tracer, Corp. in 
performing an audit without being affected 
by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act 
with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Magna, Inc. in performing 
an audit without being affected by 
influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act 
with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
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The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of the Tracer Corp.’s 
inventory value was a critical audit matter 
in the audit of Tracer Corp.’s financial 
statement as of and for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2014. Considerations 
that led to our determination included the 
following: Tracer Corp. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Tracer 
Corp.'s evaluation of the inventory value: 
(1) involved subjective auditor judgments 
in evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of Magna Inc.’s inventory 
value was a critical audit matter in the 
audit of Magna Inc.’s financial statement 
as of and for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2014. Considerations that led 
to our determination included the 
following: Magna, Inc. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Magna, 
Inc.’s evaluation of the inventory value: (1) 
involved subjective auditor judgments in 
evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
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[*REPORT WITH CONCEPT -ORIENTED INDEPENDENCE, NO TENURE, AND NO CAM 
CONDITION*]  
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Tracer, Corp. in 
performing an audit without being affected 
by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act 
with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We are a public accounting firm registered 
with the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") (United 
States) and are required to be independent 
with respect to Magna, Inc. in performing 
an audit without being affected by 
influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing the firm to act 
with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional skepticism. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
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financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
  
[*REPORT WITH NO INDEPENDENCE, ALTERNATE TENURE, AND CAM CONDITION*] 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
96 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We or our predecessor firms have served 
as Tracer Corp.'s auditor consecutively 
since 2013. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We or our predecessor firms have served 
as Magna, Inc.’s auditor consecutively 
since 1990. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
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The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of the Tracer Corp.’s 
inventory value was a critical audit matter 
in the audit of Tracer Corp.’s financial 
statement as of and for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2014. Considerations 
that led to our determination included the 
following: Tracer Corp. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Tracer 
Corp.'s evaluation of the inventory value: 
(1) involved subjective auditor judgments 
in evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of Magna Inc.’s inventory 
value was a critical audit matter in the 
audit of Magna Inc.’s financial statement 
as of and for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2014. Considerations that led 
to our determination included the 
following: Magna, Inc. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Magna, 
Inc.’s evaluation of the inventory value: (1) 
involved subjective auditor judgments in 
evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
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[*REPORT WITH NO INDEPENDENCE, ALTERNATE TENURE, AND NO CAM 
CONDITION*] 
 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
We or our predecessor firms have served 
as Tracer Corp.'s auditor consecutively 
since 2013. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
We or our predecessor firms have served 
as Magna, Inc.’s auditor consecutively 
since 1990. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
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material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
 
[*REPORT WITH NO INDEPENDENCE, NO TENURE, AND CAM CONDITION*] 
 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
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the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
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the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of the Tracer Corp.’s 
inventory value was a critical audit matter 
in the audit of Tracer Corp.’s financial 
statement as of and for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2014. Considerations 
that led to our determination included the 
following: Tracer Corp. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Tracer 
Corp.'s evaluation of the inventory value: 
(1) involved subjective auditor judgments 
in evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
Critical Audit Matter: We determined that 
our evaluation of Magna Inc.’s inventory 
value was a critical audit matter in the 
audit of Magna Inc.’s financial statement 
as of and for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2014. Considerations that led 
to our determination included the 
following: Magna, Inc. continues to 
experience increased competition with its 
"first generation" products which reduced 
revenue growth, sales prices and 
profitability. Because of these 
considerations, our assessment of Magna, 
Inc.’s evaluation of the inventory value: (1) 
involved subjective auditor judgments in 
evaluating whether management's 
judgments regarding the weight given to 
evidence of value is appropriate and (2) 
involved difficult auditor judgments in 
designing audit procedures to test the data 
underlying management's impairment 
valuation. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
 
[*REPORT WITH NO INDEPENDENCE, NO TENURE, AND NO CAM CONDITION*] 
Both Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. received a standard clean audit opinion from their 
respective auditing firms. The language of the two audit reports is as follows: 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Tracer, Corp.: 
 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT 
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders 
Magna, Inc.: 
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We have audited the balance sheets of Tracer, 
Corp. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Tracer, Corp.'s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Tracer, Corp.’s financial 
statements. 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Tracer, Corp. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
We have audited the balance sheets of Magna, 
Inc. as of December 31, 2014 and 2013, and 
the related statements of operations, 
stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each 
of the years in the three-year period ended 
December 31, 2014. Magna, Inc.’s 
management is responsible for these financial 
statements. Our responsibility is to express an 
opinion on Magna, Inc.’s financial statements. 
 
 
Our audits of the financial statements 
included performing procedures to assess the 
risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements, whether due to error or fraud, and 
performing procedures that respond to those 
risks. Such procedures include examining, on 
a test basis, appropriate evidence supporting 
regarding the amounts and disclosures in the 
financial statements. Our audits also included 
evaluating assessing the accounting principles 
used and significant estimates made by 
management, and as well as evaluating the 
overall financial statement presentation of the 
financial statements. We believe that our 
audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinions. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements 
referred to above present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of 
Magna, Inc. as of December 31, 2013 and 
2014, and the results of its operations and its 
cash flows for each of the years in the three-
year period ended December 31, 2014 in 
conformity with accounting principles 
generally accepted in the United States of 
America. 
 
The standards of the PCAOB require that 
we communicate in our report critical 
audit matters relating to the audit of the 
current period's financial statements or 
state that we determined that there are no 
critical audit matters. Critical audit matters 
are those matters addressed during the audit 
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that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
ABC Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
that (1) involved our most difficult, 
subjective, or complex judgments; (2) posed 
the most difficulty to us in obtaining 
sufficient appropriate evidence; or (3) posed 
the most difficulty to us in forming our 
opinion on the financial statements. The 
critical audit matters communicated below do 
not alter in any way our opinion on the 
financial statements, taken as a whole. 
 
We determined that there are no critical 
audit matters. 
 
XYZ Firm 
New York, New York 
February 28, 2015 
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[MANIPULATION CHECK] 
 
Select the names of the audit firms in the study. 
___ 123 Firm and 456 Firm   
___ LTW Firm and CSP Firm 
___ Smith Firm and Jones Firm 
___ ABC Firm and XYZ Firm 
 
Where is the critical audit matter discussed in the audit report?  
___ Beginning of the audit report 
___ Middle of the audit report   
___ End of the audit report 
 
Select the names of the companies in the study. 
___ Orca, Inc. and Java, Corp.   
___ Husk, Corp. and Mark, Inc. 
___ Magna, Inc. and Tracer, Corp. 
 
What fiscal years of the companies' balance sheets were audited by the respective firms?___ 
1990 and 2013 
___ 1972 and 1973 
___ 2010 and 2011  
___ 2013 and 2014 
 
[ONLY DISPLAYED IN THE INDEPENDENCE DISCLOSURE TREATMENT] 
 
Which paragraph of the audit report contains a statement about the auditor’s obligation to be 
independent?  
___ First paragraph   
___ Second paragraph 
___ Third paragraph 
___ Fourth paragraph 
 
[ONLY DISPLAYED IN THE TENURE DISCLOSURE TREATMENT] 
 
What fiscal years were provided to you in the audit reports to describe the length of the audit-
client relationships? 
___ 1970 and 1993  
___ 1980 and 2003 
___ 1990 and 2013   
___ 1995 and 2005 
 
 [PAGE BREAK] 
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[EXPERIMENTAL TASK QUESTIONS – DISTRIBUTED TO PARTICIPANTS CONCURRENT 
WITH AUDIT REPORTS] 
 
How confident are you that ABC Firm was independent in performing the audit? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that XYZ Firm was independent in performing the audit? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that ABC Firm was competent in performing the audit? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that XYZ Firm was competent in performing the audit? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that ABC Firm was transparent in performing the audit? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that XYZ Firm was transparent in performing the audit? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that the financial statement audit performed by ABC Firm was of high 
quality? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that the financial statement audit performed by XYZ Firm was of high 
quality? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that ABC Firm, as an information source, was credible? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
106 
 
How confident are you that XYZ Firm, as an information source, was credible? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
[PAGE BREAK] 
 
How confident are you that the Tracer, Corp. financial statements are free from misstatements or 
omissions? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that the Magna, Inc. financial statements are free from misstatements or 
omissions? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that the audit opinion issued by ABC Firm is reliable? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
How confident are you that the audit opinion issued by XYZ Firm is reliable? 
 
0 – NOT 
CONFIDENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
CONFIDENT 
 
Rate the influence the evaluation of Tracer, Corp.’s inventory value has on your decision to 
voluntarily invest in Tracer, Corp. 
 
0 – LOW 
INFLUENCE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
 
Rate the influence the evaluation of Magna, Inc.’s inventory value has on your decision to 
voluntarily invest in Magna, Inc. 
 
0 – LOW 
INFLUENCE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGH 
INFLUENCE 
 
How useful was Tracer, Corp.’s audit report in your investment decisions?  
 
0 – NOT 
USEFUL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – 
HIGHLY 
USEFUL 
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How useful was Magna, Inc.’s audit report in your investment decisions? 
 
0 – NOT 
USEFUL 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – 
HIGHLY 
USEFUL 
 
[PAGE BREAK] 
 
If you were approached to purchase company stock, what is the likelihood you would invest in a 
real company similar to Tracer, Corp.? 
 
0 – LOW 
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGH 
LIKELIHOOD 
 
If you were approached to purchase company stock, what is the likelihood you would invest in a 
real company similar to Magna, Inc.? 
 
0 – LOW 
LIKELIHOOD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGH 
LIKELIHOOD 
 
Of your current stock holdings, what percentage would you feel comfortable holding in publicly-
traded company stocks similar to Tracer, Corp.? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
Of your current stock holdings, what percentage would you feel comfortable holding in publicly-
traded company stocks similar to Magna, Inc.? 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
How relevant was Tracer, Corp.’s audit report in your investment decisions?  
 
0 – NOT 
RELEVANT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – 
HIGHLY 
RELEVANT 
 
How relevant was Magna, Inc.’s audit report in your investment decisions? 
 
0 – NOT 
RELEVANT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – 
HIGHLY 
RELEVANT 
 
[PAGE BREAK] 
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Assume that you are given $10,000 that you must invest. Considering the information contained 
in the respective audit reports, indicate how much of the $10,000 you would invest between 
Tracer, Corp. and Magna, Inc. The total investment allocated between the two companies must 
sum to 100%. 
___ Investment in Tracer, Corp.   
___ Investment in Magna, Inc. 
   
How informative was Tracer, Corp.’s audit report to your investment decisions?  
 
0 – NOT 
INFORMATIVE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
INFORMATIVE 
 
How informative was Magna, Inc.’s audit report to your investment decisions? 
 
0 – NOT 
INFORMATIVE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 – HIGHLY 
INFORMATIVE 
 
[PAGE BREAK] 
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[DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS] 
 
Which best describes your age?  
 
___ Under 18  
___ 18-25  
___ 26-34  
___ 35-54  
___ 55-64  
___ 65 or older  
 
Which best describes your gender?  
 
___ Female  
___ Male  
 
Which best describes your highest level of education completed?  
 
___ Less than High School (0-8 years)  
___ Some High School (9-12 years, bud did not graduate)  
___ GED or High School Equivalency  
___ High School Graduate  
___ Attended a Vocational or Trade School after High School  
___ Some College (no degree)  
___ 2-year College Degree (Associate’s degree)  
___ 4-year College Degree (BS, BA, or similar)  
___ Some postgraduate (no degree)  
___ Postgraduate (MS, MA, PhD, MD, etc.)  
 
Which best describes your years of professional experience?  
 
___ Under 3  
___ 3 – 5  
___ 6 – 10  
___ 11 – 15  
___ 16 – 20  
___ 21 – 25  
___ 26 – 30  
___ Over 30  
 
Which best describes your employment status? 
 
___ Enrolled in undergraduate program and part time employment  
___ Enrolled in undergraduate program and full time employment  
___ Enrolled in graduate program and part time employment  
___ Enrolled in graduate program and full time employment  
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___ Part time employment  
___ Full time employment  
___ Contract employment  
___ Retirement  
___ Unemployment  
 
Which best describes your occupation?  
 
___ Accounting oriented  
___ Auditing oriented  
___ Custom service oriented  
___ Finance oriented  
___ Financial reporting oriented  
___ Human resources oriented  
___ Management oriented  
___ Marketing oriented  
___ Operations oriented  
___ Production oriented  
___ Tax preparation oriented  
___ Other 
 
Which best describes your age?  
 
___ Under 18  
___ 18-25  
___ 26-34  
___ 35-54  
___ 55-64  
___ 65 or older  
 
Which constitutes the largest portion of your equity investments?  
 
___ Participation in an employer's 401(k) retirement plan  
___ Participation in an employer's 403(b) retirement plan  
___ Investment portfolio held by a non-employment related brokerage house  
___ Investment portfolio maintained by a non-employment related financial advisor  
___ Investment portfolio actively managed by self  
 
Do you actively trade through a brokerage firm or its website (e.g. Scottrade, Sharebuilder, 
eTrade, commercial bank, etc.)?  
 
___ Yes  
___ No  
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[DISPLAYED IF THE ANSWER TO THE PRECEDING QUESTION WAS “YES;” IF “NO,” 
END OF EXPERIMENT – UNIQUE 4 DIGIT CODE PROVIDED]  
 
What percentage of your assets are held by the brokerage firm?  
 
___ 0 - 10%  
___ 11 - 25%  
___ 26 - 50%  
___ 51%+  
 
Of those assets held by the brokerage, how much of the portfolio is comprised of individual 
stocks? 
 
___ less than 10%  
___ less than 25%  
___ less than 50%  
___ less than 75%  
___ greater than 75%  
 
How often do you buy stocks?  
 
___ Daily  
___ Weekly  
___ Monthly  
___ Seasonally  
___ Annually  
 
When considering buying a stock, how often do you evaluate the company's financial 
statements?  
 
___ Rarely  
___ Occasionally  
___ Usually  
___ Always  
 
When considering buying a stock, how often do you evaluate the company's audit report?  
 
___ Rarely  
___ Occasionally  
___ Usually  
___ Always 
 
[PAGE BREAK] 
 
[END OF EXPERIMENT – UNIQUE 4 DIGIT CODE PROVIDED ON NEXT SCREEN] 
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